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ABSTRACT
Under  the  TRIPS  agreement,  WTO  members  are  required  to  enforce  product  patents  for
pharmaceuticals. The debate about the merits of this requirement has been extremely contentious.
Many  low  income  economies  claim  that  patent  protection  for  pharmaceuticals  will  result  in
substantially higher prices for medicines, with adverse consequences for the health and well-being
of their citizens. On the other hand, research-based global pharmaceutical companies, argue that
prices are unlikely to rise significantly because most patented products have therapeutic substitutes.
In this paper we empirically investigate the basis of these claims. Central to the ongoing debate is
the structure of demand for pharmaceuticals in poor economies where, because health insurance
coverage is so rare, almost all medical expenses are met out-of-pocket. Using a detailed product-
level data set from India, we estimate key price and expenditure elasticities and supply-side
parameters for the fluoroquinolones sub-segment of the systemic anti-bacterials (i.e., antibiotics)
segment  of  the  Indian  pharmaceuticals  market.  We  then  use  these  estimates  to  carry  out
counterfactual simulations of what prices, profits, and consumer welfare would have been, had the
fluoroquinolone molecules we study been under patent in India as they were in the U.S. at the time.
Our results suggest that concerns about the potential adverse welfare effects of TRIPS may have
some basis. We estimate that in the presence price regulation the total annual welfare losses to the
Indian economy from the withdrawal of the four domestic product groups in the fluoroquinolone
sub-segment would be on the order of U.S. $305 million, or about 50% of the sales of the entire
systemic anti-bacterials segment in 2000. Of this amount, foregone profits of domestic producers
constitute roughly $50 million. The overwhelming portion of the total welfare loss therefore derives
from the loss of consumer welfare. In contrast, the profit gains to foreign producers in the presence
price regulation are estimated to be only around $19.6 million per year.
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Under the Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)–ﬁnalized during the
Uruguay round of multilateral trade negotiations in 1995–nations must, as a condition of member-
ship in the World Trade Organization (WTO), recognize and enforce product patents in all ﬁelds of
technology, including pharmaceuticals. At the time the TRIPS agreement went into eﬀect, many low
and middle income countries made an exception for pharmaceuticals, even if they recognized prod-
uct patents in other areas, because low-cost access to life-saving drugs and essential medicines was
deemed to be an overriding public policy priority. To meet their obligations under TRIPS however
these countries had to introduce or amend their patent legislation to include pharmaceutical product
patents, with the transition- and least-developed economies having until 2005 to do so.
The negotiations leading up to TRIPS, and in particular the provisions relating to pharmaceuticals,
were highly contentious. Though more than 10 years have passed since TRIPS was ﬁnalized, there con-
tinues to be considerable controversy and debate regarding its merits. The main point of contention is
the claim made by governments of many poor developing economies that unqualiﬁed patent protection
for pharmaceuticals will result in substantially higher prices for medicines, with adverse consequences
for the health and well-being of their citizens. Countering this claim, research-based global pharma-
ceutical companies, which have potentially lost billions of dollars because of patent infringement by
Third World ﬁrms that have reverse-engineered their products, argue that the introduction of product
patents is unlikely to signiﬁcantly raise prices because most patented products have many therapeutic
substitutes. Moreover, they claim that the absence of patent protection has served as a disincentive
to engage in research on diseases that disproportionately aﬄict the world’s poor, implying that patent
protection for pharmaceuticals will actually beneﬁt less-developed economies by stimulating innovation
and transfer of technology.
Given the scope of TRIPS and the intensity of the accompanying debate, it is remarkable how
sparse the evidence is, on which these divergent claims are based.1 Apart from the ﬁndings of a small
number of studies that we refer to in more detail below, little is known about the extent to which
pharmaceutical prices in less-developed economies might increase with the introduction of product
patents, and the magnitude of the associated welfare losses.2 Past empirical studies on the impact of
1There is a sizeable theoretical literature on the welfare impact of patent protection that generally ﬁnds that the
eﬀects of patents in a multi-country setting are substantially more complicated than their respective eﬀects in a single
closed economy where both innovating ﬁrms and innovation beneﬁciaries (i.e., consumers) are of the same nationality
(see Nordhaus (1969), Chin and Grossman (1990), Diwan and Rodrik (1991), Deardorﬀ (1992), Helpman (1993), and
Grossman and Lai (2003) for related arguments). Empirical work in this area is however still in its infancy.
2Even less is known about the other central questions relevant to the TRIPS debate, namely the extent to which
pharmaceutical research and product development priorities are likely to shift as a result of TRIPS, and how large the
welfare beneﬁts of any therapeutically innovative drugs that result from this shift are likely to be. The only paper that
has carefully addressed such questions is Lanjouw and Cockburn (2001).patents on prices and innovative activity in various sectors, including pharmaceuticals, have focused
almost exclusively on developed economies. Aside from the fact that none of these studies estimate
welfare eﬀects, the conclusions from these studies are not directly pertinent to the TRIPS debate
because the structure of demand for pharmaceuticals in less-developed economies diﬀers from that in
developed economies in several critical respects3.
Any assessment of the potential price and welfare eﬀects of TRIPS needs therefore to be based
on a better empirically-grounded understanding of the characteristics of demand and the structure of
markets for pharmaceuticals in poor developing economies. To what extent are consumers willing to
trade oﬀ lower prices for older, possibly less eﬀective therapies? How does this vary across diﬀerent
therapeutic segments? Are consumers willing to pay a premium for the pedigree and brand reputation
of products marketed by subsidiaries of foreign multinationals? How competitive are pharmaceutical
markets? The welfare of consumers depends on the pricing strategies and decisions of pharmaceutical
ﬁrms. But these in turn derive from the ﬁrms’ assessment of the structure of market demand. If
consumers are unwilling to pay substantially more for newer patented drugs for which there exist older,
possibly slightly less eﬀective generic substitutes, the ability of patent-holders to charge a premium
will be limited. As mentioned above, there have been a few studies that carefully considered these
issues and used explicit models of consumer and ﬁrm behavior to simulate the welfare losses implied
by patent protection4.H o w e v e r ,t h e i rﬁndings are ultimately limited by the fact that the simulations
that are used to evaluate the potential impact of patents are in each instance based on assumptions
about demand characteristics and market structure, rather than on actual estimates of the relevant
parameters.
This paper takes a ﬁrst step towards ﬁlling this gap. We provide the ﬁrst rigorously-derived esti-
mates of the possible impact of pharmaceutical product patents on prices and welfare in a developing
economy. Using detailed product-level data on monthly pharmaceutical prices and sales over a two
year period from January 1999 to December 2000, we estimate key price and expenditure elastici-
ties and supply-side parameters for the ﬂuoroquinolone (quinolone henceforth5)s e g m e n to fs y s t e m i c
anti-bacterials (i.e., antibiotics) in the Indian pharmaceuticals market. We chose this segment both
because it contains several products that were still under patent in the U.S. during our sample period,
and because antibiotics are important from a public health policy point of view (compared to let’s
say Prozac, Viagra, or other life-style drugs that were also under patent protection in the U.S. during
this period). We then use our estimates to carry out counterfactual simulations of what prices, proﬁts
3For a representative example of estimation of pharmaceuticals demand in developed countries see Ellison, Cockburn,
Griliches and Hausman (1997).
4See for instance, Challu (1991), Fink (2000), Maskus and Konan (1994), Nogues (1993), Subramanian (1995), and
Wattal (2000).
5Technically, the term “ﬂuoroquinolones” refers to the latest generation of quinolones. However, older quinolones
(e.g., nalidixic acid) have market shares close to zero.
2(of both domestic ﬁrms and subsidiaries of foreign multinationals) and consumer welfare would have
been, had the quinolone molecules we study been under patent in India as they were in the U.S. at
the time. The presence of many therapeutic substitutes within the antibiotics segment, make this
product category ideal for investigating the claim that the presence of close substitutes will prevent
drug prices from rising once patent protection is enforced. Of course, to the extent that our estimates
refer to antibiotics, they are not directly applicable to other pharmaceutical product categories that
may have diﬀerent demand structures. For example, a ﬁnding of large substitution eﬀects towards
non-patented products would not necessarily apply to a market segment with only few, or possibly
no therapeutic substitutes. Still, a ﬁnding of limited substitution towards other drugs and associated
large price increases, would suggest that the eﬀects of patent enforcement in other pharmaceutical
segments with fewer therapeutic substitutes might be even larger.
India provides a natural setting for our analysis for a number of reasons. It is a leading example of
a low-income country that did not recognize pharmaceutical product patents at the time the TRIPS
agreement went into eﬀect. In fact, during the Uruguay round of negotiations, India led the opposition
to the TRIPS articles mandating pharmaceutical product patents. In terms of the structure of demand,
India is a prototypical example of a low-income country with a large number of poor households who,
because health insurance coverage is non-existent, have to meet all medical expenses out-of-pocket.
Moreover, the disease proﬁle of the Indian population mirrors that of many other low-income countries
and is considerably diﬀerent from that of most developed economies. Lastly, the domestic Indian
pharmaceutical industry, which as of 2002 was the largest producer of generic drugs in the world in
terms of volume, is typical of that in many middle-income countries with large numbers of small and
medium sized ﬁrms with signiﬁcant imitative capabilities producing and marketing drugs domestically
that are under patent elsewhere.
During the period covered by our data, several molecules in the quinolone family were still under
patent in the U.S., but products containing these molecules were being produced and distributed in
India by both a number of domestic ﬁrms and a number of local subsidiaries of foreign multinationals.
We aggregate these products into a number of mutually exclusive product groups where, within each
product group all products contain the same quinolone molecule (e.g., ciproﬂoxacin or norﬂoxacin,
etc.), and are produced by ﬁrms with the same domestic or foreign status. We then estimate a two-
level demand system employing the Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) speciﬁcation of Deaton and
Muellbauer (1980) in both levels. The higher level corresponds to the allocation of expenditures to
various sub-segments within the systemic anti-bacterials segment of the market. At the lower level we
estimate the parameters relevant for the allocation of expenditures within the quinolone sub-segment to
the various product groups within this sub-segment (e.g., foreign ciproﬂoxacin, domestic ciproﬂoxacin,
domestic norﬂoxacin, etc.).
3With these estimates in hand we turn to the counterfactuals. The basic counterfactual scenarios
we consider all involve the withdrawal of one or more of the domestic quinolone product groups from
the market. The idea here is that had U.S. patents for, say, ciproﬂoxacin, been recognized in India, all
domestic products containing ciproﬂoxacin would not be present in the market. That would leave only
the foreign ciproﬂoxacin product group in the market. Using our estimates of the own, cross-price,
and expenditure elasticities of the various product groups, as well as estimates for the upper and lower
bounds of marginal costs of production, we are able to simulate the prices and market shares that
would obtain under each of the scenarios. Moreover, using the expenditure function associated with
the higher-level AIDS speciﬁcation we are able to calculate the welfare loss–measured in terms of
the compensating variation, i.e., the additional expenditure that the representative Indian consumer
would need to incur to maintain her utility level in the face of the domestic product withdrawal(s)
and the accompanying price and market share changes–under each of the counterfactual scenarios.
Apart from the fact that our counterfactual simulations are based on estimated rather than assumed
parameter values, this paper builds upon the earlier studies in two substantive, and (it turns out)
empirically important, ways.
First, by accommodating the possibility that consumers may diﬀerentiate between domestic and
foreign products even when these products contain the same patentable molecule, we allow for an
additional channel through which the introduction of product patents and the consequent withdrawal
of domestic products may adversely aﬀect consumers; and that is through the loss of product variety.
In contrast, previous studies on developing countries assume that consumers are indiﬀerent between
foreign and domestic products that contain the same molecule. What this implies is that any adverse
welfare eﬀects are only realized through increased prices. The diﬀerence is most evident if we consider
a scenario under which domestic products are forced to withdraw from the market because of the
introduction of product patents, but strict price regulations maintain prices at pre-patent levels. In
our approach consumers would still experience a welfare loss, whereas in the framework adopted in
earlier studies, such a scenario would entail no loss of welfare.
Empirically, the component of the consumer welfare loss attributable to the reduction of variety
from the withdrawal of domestic products turns out to be signiﬁcant. We interpret this component
as capturing primarily an “ease of access” eﬀect: due to diﬀerences in the marketing and distribution
networks, domestic products are more readily available to Indian consumers than products produced
by foreign subsidiaries. From a policy perspective, this suggests a possible role for compulsory licensing
in addition to or in lieu of price regulation, since the latter, by itself, will not alleviate the welfare loss
due to loss of variety. Alternatively, one could argue that - to the extent that the loss we attribute to
the reduction of product variety is due to the fact that the current product portfolios and distribution
networks of foreign producers are limited - it is purely a transitional phenomenon, and should thus not
4be included in the welfare calculations. This is a controversial point that we discuss in detail in the
results section. If foreign ﬁrms respond to patent enforcement by investing in distribution networks
or by using licensing agreements with domestic ﬁrms to make their products more readily available to
Indian consumers, the “ease of access” eﬀect would indeed diminish in importance in the longer run,
though of course it could be signiﬁcant in the ﬁrst years after patent enforcement. However, whether
these investments will materialize, is open to debate. If TRIPS is accompanied by price regulation in
order to limit price increases in poor developing countries, the incentives of multinationals to invest
in marketing and distribution in these countries may diminish. At any rate, to take into account the
possibility that the welfare loss due to the reduction of variety is a temporary phenomenon, we also
present a more conservative welfare loss estimate, by subtracting the “product variety” component
from our total loss estimate. This gives us a lower bound estimate that is due to price increases alone.
Though only about a third of our upper bound estimate, in absolute terms this lower bound estimate
is still very large, representing 24% of antibiotic sales in 2000.
A second, and perhaps even more important methodological diﬀerence between this paper and
earlier studies is that we allow for and ﬂexibly estimate a range of cross-product-group and cross-
molecule substitution eﬀects. In contrast, cross-price eﬀects are ignored in earlier studies. To see why
cross-price eﬀects are likely to signiﬁcantly alter estimated welfare eﬀects in this context, imagine a
scenario where the introduction of patents leads to monopoly pricing in the market for a particular
patentable molecule. If the markets for potential substitutes are imperfectly competitive, then the
increase in price in the original patentable market will lead to corresponding upward price adjustments
in the related markets as producers of substitute products reoptimize in the face of the increased
demand for their products. The magnitude of any upward adjustments will naturally vary with the
degree of competition in related markets, and with the strength of the cross-price eﬀects. But as long
as the cross-price eﬀects are positive, and related markets are not perfectly competitive, the loss of
consumer surplus because of monopoly pricing in one market will be multiplied through the ripple
eﬀects of upward price adjustments in related markets.
If this were just a theoretical possibility it would not be of much interest. However, these multiplier
eﬀects turn out to be substantial in our counterfactual scenarios. Most strikingly, the estimated loss of
consumer welfare from the simultaneous withdrawal of all four domestic product groups–the scenario
that most closely resembles what is likely to happen under TRIPS–is more than two times the sum of
the estimated losses from the four separate scenarios in each of which only one of the domestic product
groups is withdrawn. What this very clearly indicates is that past studies that have estimated the
aggregate eﬀects of patent protection by adding up the losses, estimated separately in each of a number
of patentable markets, may have substantially underestimated the magnitude of the consumer welfare
losses from the introduction of pharmaceutical product patents.
5In absolute terms, we estimate that in the absence of any price regulation the prices of foreign
patented products would rise between 100% and 400%. In the more realistic case of some form of
price regulation that would keep drug prices ﬁxed at their pre-TRIPS level, the total annual welfare
losses to the Indian economy from the withdrawal of all four domestic product groups in the quinolone
sub-segment would be on the order of Rs. 13.70 billion, or about 50% of the sales of the entire systemic
anti-bacterials segment in 2000. At the then prevailing exchange rate this translates into a ﬁgure of
U.S. $305 million. Of this amount, foregone proﬁts of domestic producers constitute roughly Rs. 2.3
billion or U.S. $50 million. The overwhelming portion of the total welfare loss therefore derives from
the loss of consumer welfare.
The welfare loss we estimate represents only the static costs of patent enforcement arising from
pricing distortions and reduction in product variety. Our approach does not address the potential
dynamic beneﬁts of innovations that may result from international property rights protection. Never-
theless, we believe that estimating these static costs is important whenever there is a radical change in
policy - which TRIPS represents for a good part of the developing world. Even if there is the potential
for long-term beneﬁts, knowledge of the short-run costs is important for designing an appropriate
policy response that will potentially mitigate the adverse short-run impact. Having said that, it is
worth noting that according to our estimates, the total proﬁt gains of patent enforcement to foreign
producers in the absence of any price regulation would be only about U.S. $53 million per year. With
price regulation that would keep the prices of drugs supplied by multinational subsidiaries at their
pre-TRIPS level, the proﬁt gains become only U.S. $19.6 million per year.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section we lay out the essential
features of the Indian pharmaceuticals market, provide more detail about the segments that we focus
on in the empirical analysis, and brieﬂy describe the primary data we use. Section 3 describes the
analytic framework and the econometric strategy we use to estimate the relevant parameters and
construct the counterfactual scenarios. We discuss our results in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2. The setting and the data
Between April 1972, when the Indian Patents Act (1970) became eﬀective, and March 2005, when
India’s parliament passed the 3rd Amendment of the Patents Act, India did not recognize product
patents for pharmaceuticals. The Indian Patents Act (1970), which replaced the inherited British colo-
nial law regarding intellectual property rights, speciﬁcally excluded pharmaceutical product patents
and only admitted process patents for a period of seven years. In contrast the latest amendment
recognizes patents on end products that under the new regime will remain in force for twenty years.6
6Indian companies that are now producing drugs for which patent applications were submitted between the signing
of the TRIPS agreement in 1995 and January 1, 2005 will be allowed to continue producing if they pay a royalty to the
6The two stated objectives of the 1970 act were: the development of an indigenous pharmaceuticals
industry; and the provision of low-cost access to medicines for Indian consumers. Consistent with these
objectives, and with the broader leftward tilt in policy, a number of other measures were introduced–
drug price controls, restrictions on capacity expansion, limits on multinational equity shares, etc.–that
in the years since have, on the one hand, kept pharmaceutical prices low, and on the other encouraged
the development of the Indian pharmaceutical industry. Many of these regulations and restrictions
have been lifted or eased since the mid-1980s with marked acceleration in the pace of liberalization
during the 1990s.
Over the last twenty years the Indian pharmaceutical industry has grown rapidly to the point
where it is now the world’s largest producer of formulations in terms of volume, and one of the world’s
largest producers of bulk drugs.7 The structure of the industry has also evolved. In 1970 the industry
was dominated by multinational subsidiaries; by 2001, Indian-owned ﬁr m sw e r en o tj u s tt h el e a d i n g
players in the industry, many had also become major exporters.
The data we use in this paper are from the retail pharmaceutical audits of ORG-MARG, India’s
premier market research and consulting ﬁrm. The audit provides detailed product-level information–
estimates of monthly retail sales in each of the four geographic zones of India, price, dosage form, launch
date, brand name, chemical name, therapeutic categorization, etc.–on all pharmaceutical products
sold in India by about 300 of the largest ﬁrms, representing roughly 90% of domestic retail sales of
pharmaceuticals. The coverage of the audit is extensive, reaching a representative panel of thousands
of retail chemists in over 350 cities and towns. The data collected, which provide the only real source
of disaggregate information on the Indian pharmaceutical market, are used by both the government
of India in formulating pricing policy and other decisions, and the Indian pharmaceutical industry in
determining pricing and marketing strategies. We have information at a monthly frequency for the
period of January 1999 to December 2000. Tables 1-3 provide a set of descriptive statistics that are
essential for understanding the focus of our analysis and interpreting our results.
As noted earlier, the characteristics of demand for pharmaceuticals in India are likely to diﬀer
considerably from those in developed economies. With a share of 23%, the anti-infectives segment
ranks second in India, whereas in the world market it is ﬁfth and has a share of only 9.0%. Hence,
anti-infectives are important in India not only from a health-public-policy point of view, but also as a
source of ﬁrm revenue.
With this in mind, we focus in this paper on one particular sub-segment of anti-infectives, namely
patent holder.
7Bulk drugs are the therapeutically relevant active pharmaceutical ingredients that are combined with a variety of
inactive ingredients to make the formulations that are ultimately consumed by patients. Firms in the pharmaceutical
sector can be of one of three types: bulk drugs producers, pure formulators, or integrated ﬁrms, which produce both
bulk drugs and market formulations.
7the quinolone sub-segment. Quinolones fall into the systemic anti-biotics and anti-bacterials segment
of the Indian pharmaceuticals market, which generates over three-quarters of the revenues in the anti-
infectives segment8. The systemic anti-bacterials segment includes all of the original miracle drugs
that ﬁrst sparked the growth of the global research-based pharmaceutical industry in the post-World
War II period, as well as later generations of molecules that have been introduced in the last four
decades.
Among systemic anti-bacterials, quinolones are the latest generation molecules available in India.
We focus our analysis on quinolones for several reasons. First, quinolones are the drug of choice for
a large number of bacterial infections, some of which are also treated by alternative drugs (see Table
A1 in the Appendix, which outlines the spectrum of activity for each molecule family within the anti-
bacterials segment). Hence, if there were one product group for which we would expect to have many
substitutes readily available, this would be quinolones. Second, with a share of 20% in the sales of
systemic anti-bacterials, quinolones represent one of the largest sub-segments within this therapeutic
category. Finally, several molecules within the quinolone sub-segment were still under patent in the
U.S. at the time of our investigation. This is shown in Table 2 that details the basic information
about the four quinolone molecules that are the focus of our analysis. The ﬁrst row shows the year of
U.S. patent expiry; this ranges from 1998 for norﬂoxacin, to 2010 for sparﬂoxacin. Quinolones include
in principle four more molecules that are listed at the bottom of Table 1; however, the market shares
of these molecules are negligible, so that we exclude these molecules from our analysis.
Table 2 reveals several other interesting facts about competition in the quinolone market in India.
First, note the large number of ﬁrms operating in this sub-segment. The large number of domestic ﬁrms
is perhaps not that surprising given that pharmaceutical product patents were not recognized in India.9
What is more surprising is the number of foreign ﬁrms selling patented products (e.g., ciproﬂoxacin);
the fact that multiple foreign ﬁrms sell a patented product indicates that such ﬁrms often “infringe”10
patent laws in India, while complying with them in developed world countries. The last two rows
of Table 2 further indicate that domestic products often sell at a premium. With the exception of
oﬂoxacin, the average prices of products oﬀered by Indian ﬁrms are higher than the prices of products
oﬀered by foreign subsidiaries. This preliminary evidence suggests that Indian consumers do not place
a premium on the brand name and reputation of big multinational pharmaceutical concerns. Moreover,
the higher price of domestic products does not seem to prevent domestic companies from capturing a
large market share. This is most evident in the case of ciproﬂoxacin, where domestic ﬁrms have, with
8In addition to anti-bacterials, this segment contains also anti-virals.
9Accordingly, the common distinction between “branded” and “generic” products is irrelevant here.
10We emphasize here that the word "infringe" belongs in quotes: Because patent laws do not currently exist in India,
infringement in the legal sense is not possible. It is however striking that the same ﬁrms that accuse Indian producers of
“piracy” sell in India products that are patented in the U.S., and for which the patent is held by a diﬀerent multinational
corporation.
853%, the largest share in the total sales of quinolones; and this despite the fact that the average price
of these products is 10% higher than the price of foreign products containing the same molecule.
Table 3 provides additional summary statistics for our data, broken down by region. The ﬁrst
two rows of the table report the average annual household expenditure on quinolones and antibiotics
respectively. Note that in both cases the average expenditure is higher in North and West; these regions
include states with higher per-capita incomes, and tend to be more industrialized and urbanized than
those in the East and South. Pharmaceutical products are available in multiple presentations, that is
combinations of dosage forms (capsule, tablet, syrup, etc.), strength (100 milligrams, 500 milligrams,
etc.), and packet sizes (50 capsule bottle, 100 tablet bottle, etc.). The various presentations in which
a product is available are often referred to as stock-keeping units or SKUs.11 The number of SKUs for
each product group within quinolones is reported at the top of Table 3. As with the more aggregate
numbers on ﬁrms and products reported in Table 2, the diﬀerence between domestic and foreign
products is striking. The number of SKUs oﬀered by Indian ﬁrms is consistently larger than the
number oﬀered by subsidiaries of foreign multinationals. The number of SKUs varies slightly across
regions, but, more importantly, it varies across time, as some SKUs disappear, while new ones get
introduced during our sample period.
Many pharmaceutical products in India are subject to price controls.12 While the speciﬁcs of the
price regulation are too complex for any economic model to adequately capture, the main concern for
the empirical analysis is that price controls may lead to a lack of price variation over time, so that the
demand function cannot be identiﬁed. Prices at the most disaggregate, SKU, level are relatively stable
over time; there are variations due to occasional changes in the estimated cost (due for example to
changes in exchange rates that aﬀect the cost of imported materials or bulk drugs), but such variations
tend to be infrequent and small in magnitude. The degree of time variation is however substantially
larger once one aggregates to the product level. This variability stems not only from the fact that the
SKUs over which we aggregate may experience changes in their respective prices at diﬀerent points in
time, but also from the fact that the range of SKUs oﬀered in the market does not remain constant
over time. The entry and exit of presentations within the same product group that have diﬀerent
prices eﬀectively aﬀects the price that consumers face for this drug in each period.
The middle portion of Table 3 reports the mean price and standard deviation for each product
group by region. Prices vary by region, though there is no clear pattern emerging from the table
with regard to the cross-regional variation (in the sense of some regions being systematically more
11For instance, a 100 capsule bottle of 100 milligram capsules of a particular branded drug, and a 50 capsule bottle of
100 milligram capsules of the same branded drug would be identiﬁed as two separate SKUs.
12The details of the procedures for price ﬁxation can be found in the oﬃcial government website:
http://www.nppaindia.nic.in/index1.html, under the link “Drug Price Control Order 1995”. A new pharmaceutical
policy was introduced in 2002, but our data were collected before that year.
9expensive than others). To examine what portion of the total price variation is due to time versus
regional variation, we conducted an analysis of variance of prices that we report in Table 4. The
table is based on separate regressions for each product group (pooling data across groups with big
diﬀerences in their average prices is not particularly informative, as most of the price variation is
accounted for by product group dummies). The last two columns of the table show the fraction of
price variation that is accounted for by region and time dummies respectively. As evident from the
table, a signiﬁcant fraction of the total variance in prices can be attributed to time variation. In the
demand estimation we include a full set of product group-speciﬁc regional dummies, so that the price
parameters are identiﬁed entirely based on this time variation within each product group. The time
variation of product group prices is driven primarily by compositional changes within each group: the
revenue shares of the individual SKUs that comprise each product group change over time (see the
related discussion in section 3.3), while in each period, there is entry and exit of SKUs into the sample.
To check whether this pattern reﬂects genuine entry and exit, as opposed to sampling variation, we
examined the revenue shares of the SKUs that leave the sample relative to the ones that remain during
the entire period. The results are reported in Table 5. While the SKUs that exit tend to be smaller
(their average share is 1% as opposed to 3.4% for those SKUs that are present during the entire sample
period), the shares of the two groups do not seem orders of magnitude apart13. In addition, our data
cover only the 300 largest ﬁrms selling in the Indian market, so that ﬁrms with very small shares are
not included in our sample.
3. The analytic framework and estimation approach
Patent enforcement in the Indian pharmaceutical market will have the eﬀect of eliminating domestic
products whose active pharmaceutical ingredients are protected by (foreign) patents. Thus, assessing
the eﬀects of patent enforcement is tantamount to assessing the eﬀects of withdrawing domestic prod-
ucts from the market. This task is the converse of evaluating new product introduction; accordingly,
the conceptual framework we use to address the questions of interest is similar to the one developed
in the literature for the valuation of new goods.14
We start by estimating demand for quinolones. Given that the market is characterized by imperfect
competition, the counterfactual analysis requires that we also model the supply side, as removal of
one product will aﬀect the prices of other products, especially those that are close competitors. The
existence of price regulation in the Indian pharmaceutical market imposes potential constraints on
13While we cannot completely rule out the possibility that some of the exit is due to sampling variation, note that
the latter should be reﬂected in low precision of the demand parameter estimates. However, the demand parameters are
precisely estimated.
14See Trajtenberg (1989), Hausman (1994), and Bresnahan (2004) for representative examples and a discussion of the
relevant issues.
10ﬁrms’ maximization problem. Given these constraints and the complexity of the price regulation
process, the typical approach of deriving estimates of actual marginal costs and markups by exploiting
the ﬁrst order conditions of proﬁt maximizing ﬁrms does not seem particularly promising. Instead, we
use our demand estimates to place upper and lower bounds on marginal costs and markups.
With demand elasticities and upper and lower bounds for marginal costs in place, we then con-
duct counterfactual simulations. We consider several alternative scenarios depending on the number
of domestic products that are aﬀected by patent enforcement. For each scenario, we compute the
counterfactual prices, and use them to assess the eﬀects of domestic product withdrawal on consumer
welfare (as measured by the compensating variation), ﬁrm proﬁts, and social welfare. As with the
valuation of new products, the big conceptual problem facing this part of the analysis is that we need
to extrapolate from the region of the data to the point at which demand for the products that exit
the market becomes zero. This conceptual issue is present in any attempt to evaluate a major policy
change for which no historical precedent exists, like the enforcement of patent laws in India. One
advantage of the present study is that we have a limited set of price data for Pakistan, a country with
similar demographics as India, but with a market structure that resembles the one that would emerge
in India under patent enforcement (monopoly of multinational subsidiaries). By comparing the prices
of products oﬀered by multinationals in Pakistan to those we compute in our counterfactual simula-
tions for the products that would be oﬀered by multinationals in India if patent laws were enforced,
we can get a sense of how plausible our counterfactual estimates are.
3.1. Demand
The demand modelling is based on the multi-stage budgeting approach. Our primary motivation for
adopting this approach was a practical one. In the multi-stage budgeting approach the dependent
variable is deﬁned as a revenue share, which is appealing here given that the products we include
in the analysis contain diﬀerent molecules (i.e., active pharmaceutical ingredients, or APIs). Even
though we do have data on the quantity of the relevant API (e.g., 100 milligrams of ciproﬂoxacin)
contained in each product, converting the revenue shares to physical shares is extremely diﬃcult, if
not infeasible, in the case of anti-biotics. Because such drugs are “systemic” by nature, they are used
to treat a large number of infections, and the dosage of each drug depends on the particular infection
it is supposed to address (for example the dosage will diﬀer depending on whether the anti-biotic is
used to combat an ear-infection or tuberculosis). This particular feature of anti-biotics complicates
the conversion of revenue to physical shares.
The basic idea of the multi-stage budgeting approach is to use the therapeutic classiﬁcation of
a product–i.e., the therapeutic segment and sub-segment the product belongs to–to organize all
products in the systemic anti-bacterials segment into a hierarchical taxonomy, consisting of two lev-
11els. At the higher level are the various sub-segments of systemic anti-bacterials. The ﬁrst stage of
budgeting corresponds to the allocation of expenditures across the sub-segments in this upper level of
the taxonomy.
In the second stage of the budgeting process, corresponding to the lower level of the taxonomy,
a ﬂexible functional form is adopted to model how the expenditures allocated to each sub-segment
are distributed across the products within that sub-segment. In particular, to model demand at the
second stage we employ the “Almost Ideal Demand System” (AIDS) speciﬁcation proposed by Deaton
and Muellbauer (1980).15
While the two-stage demand estimation approach oﬀers functional form ﬂexibility, its application
to the Indian systemic antibiotics market poses a couple of problems. The ﬁrst one is that due to
entry and exit, many SKUs and even products in our sample are not present in every period. AIDS
does not have a good way of dealing with a varying number of products, as it was developed with
broad commodity categories in mind, which are consumed by all consumers every period. To solve this
problem, we aggregate within each sub-segment (e.g., quinolones) SKUs into product groups, where
within each product group, all SKUs contain the same molecule and are produced by ﬁrms with the
same domestic/foreign status. Speciﬁcally, let a SKU k be indexed by its molecule (or API) M,i t s
domestic/foreign status DF indicating whether it is produced by a domestic (Indian) or a subsidiary
of a foreign (multinational) ﬁrm, a particular presentation s, and the particular ﬁrm f that produces
it. We aggregate SKUs over presentations and ﬁrms to obtain a newly deﬁned product group i, which
is only indexed by molecule M and domestic/foreign status DF, and has revenue Ri = Σf,sRk,w i t h
i ∈ (M,DF),k∈ (M,DF,f,s), and price pi = Σf,sωkpk,w h e r eωk denotes the conditional (on M and
DF) revenue share of this particular product, i.e.,:
ωk =
Rk
Ri
(3.1)
In most cases, the resulting product groups are broad enough to be present every period16.
The usual concern with this aggregation procedure is that it may lead us to overstate ﬁrms’ market
power, as we ignore competition among ﬁrms with the same domestic/foreign status, producing the
same molecule. However, in the present application this concern is unlikely to be of great importance,
as the eﬀect of patent enforcement is to wipe out all domestic competition at once, while granting
15Representative applications of the multi-stage budgeting approach include Ellison, Cockburn, Griliches and Hausman
(1997), Hausman (1994), and Hausman and Leonard (2002).
16We are only missing 4 observations (i.e., month/region combinations), all for the drug group of Foreign Norﬂoxacin:
Aug. 1999 in the South, May 2000 in the West, Oct. 2000 in the South, and Nov. 2000 in the East. In these cases, we
set the revenue shares of Foreign Norﬂoxacin equal to zero. In general, with 0.1% of quinolone sales (see Table 1, row
2), Foreign Norﬂoxacin has a very small share of the market. This probably explains why the results pertaining to this
drug group are unreliable: it is the only drug group for which we do not obtain a signiﬁcant price elasticity of demand,
while its cross-price elasticities with other foreign drug groups often have the wrong sign.
12foreign ﬁrms monopoly power; hence, competition among ﬁrms for patented molecules becomes irrel-
evant. The aggregation according to the domestic/foreign status (within a particular molecule) thus
corresponds to the scope of our analysis and the particular questions of interest.
The second problem is that for our approach to be useful in welfare analysis, the allocation of
total expenditures to group expenditures at the higher stage has to be modelled in a way consistent
with utility maximization. In general, the solution of this allocation problem requires knowledge of
all individual product prices. From an empirical point of view this is not particularly useful, as it
eliminates all computational advantages of the two-stage approach. To address this problem we adopt
an approximate solution to model the higher level expenditure allocation along the lines suggested by
Deaton and Muellbauer (1980b, pp. 131-132). This gives rise to a two-level AIDS speciﬁcation.
Consider the lower level estimation ﬁrst, which refers to the allocation of a particular sub-segment’s
expenditure to the product groups within the sub-segment. In our application the relevant sub-segment
is quinolones, which we index with Q. Let the product groups within this sub-segment be indexed by
i =1 ,...N, pi be the price of product group i (where, as noted above, i refers to a particular molecule
and domestic/foreign status combination), and XQ the total expenditure on the quinolone segment.
The revenue share of each product group is given by:
ωi = αi + Σjγij lnpj + βi ln(
XQ
PQ
) (3.2)
where ωi, the revenue share of product group i,i sd e ﬁned as:
ωi ≡
piqi
Σjpjqj
=
xi
XQ
,w i t hi,j ∈ Q (3.3)
XQ is the overall expenditure on the quinolone sub-segment, and PQ is a price index given by:
lnPQ = a(p)=α0 + Σiαi lnpi +
1
2
ΣiΣje γij lnpi lnpj (3.4)
With a limited number of product groups and a suﬃciently large number of time-series observations,
the ﬂexibility implied by the AIDS model does not impose too many demands on the data. However, in
the present application where the number of observations is limited, the AIDS model is not estimable
in this general form. To reduce the number of parameters that need to be estimated, we impose two
sets of restrictions.
The ﬁrst set of restrictions are implied by the theory of utility maximization. Speciﬁcally, these
restrictions are:
• Adding-up: Σkαk =1 ; Σkβk =0 ; Σke γkj =0 , ∀j.
• Homogeneity: Σke γjk =0 , ∀j.
13• Symmetry: γij = 1
2[e γij + e γji]=γji. This last restriction by itself reduces the number of γ
parameters to
N(N+1)
2 .
The second set of restrictions we impose aims at further reducing the number of γ parameters to be
estimated by exploiting our knowledge of this particular market. Speciﬁcally, for each product group
i,w ea l l o wo n eγij parameter for all product groups j that have diﬀerent molecules from product
group i and are produced by foreign ﬁrms, and one γij for product groups j with diﬀerent molecules
produced by domestic ﬁrms. We don’t impose any restrictions on the γij parameter when product
group j has the same molecule as product group i. (By construction, product groups i and j contain
products produced by ﬁrms with diﬀerent domestic/foreign status.)
To better illustrate the nature of the restrictions we impose on the patterns of substitution across
products, some additional notation is needed. Let d(i,j) be an indicator of the degree of similarity (or
diﬀerence) between product group i and product group j, along the dimensions we are able to observe
(molecule M and domestic/foreign status DF). For any two product groups, i and j, d(i,j) can take
on one of the following three values:17
d(i,j)=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎩
(1,0) if Mi = Mj,DF i 6= DFj
(0,1) if Mi 6= Mj,DF i = DFj
(0,0) if Mi 6= Mj,DF i 6= DFj
(3.5)
Let
Dab
i = {j : d(i,j)=( a,b)} (3.6)
the equation at the lower level becomes:
ωi = αi + γii lnpi + Σj∈D10
i [γi,10 lnpj]+Σj∈D01
i [γi,01 lnpj] (3.7)
+Σj∈D00
i [γi,00 lnpj]+βi ln(
XQ
PQ
)
Note that:
• the parameter γii captures a product group’s own price eﬀect (note that there will be as many
γii parameters as number of product groups).
• the parameter γi,10 captures the cross-price eﬀects across product groups containing products
with the same molecule but produced by ﬁrms of diﬀerent nationality.
17The sequence (1,1) is not possible for two diﬀerent products; in this case the γ parameter corresponds to the product’s
own price eﬀect, that is γii.
14• the parameter γi,01 captures the cross-price eﬀects of product groups containing products with
diﬀerent molecules but produced by ﬁrms with the same nationality.
• the parameter γi,00 captures the cross-price eﬀects of product groups containing products with
diﬀerent molecules produced by ﬁrms of diﬀerent nationality.
Before we take the demand equation to the data, we make two modiﬁcations. The ﬁrst one is to let
the product speciﬁce ﬀects αi vary by region r. The resulting product-speciﬁcr e g i o n a le ﬀects αir have
two interpretations: ﬁrst, they control for the “quality” of each drug, with quality diﬀerences being
allowed to vary across regions; second, they proxy for demographics and other demand shifters, which
vary by region, and may aﬀect the demand of each product group diﬀerently18. Note that by including
product-speciﬁcr e g i o n a le ﬀects in the demand speciﬁcation, we estimate the price parameters based
on the within product group variation of prices in each region. In an earlier version of the paper we
also estimated the demand system without regional dummies and obtained similar results.
The second modiﬁcation that allows us to go from a deterministic to a stochastic speciﬁcation of
the demand equation is to include an additive error term in (3.2). The latter takes into account the
fact that (3.2) is not expected to ﬁt the data exactly. The error term εirt accounts for measurement
error (due to the fact that the product group prices pjrt we employ in the estimation are not exact
price indices, but approximations thereof) and (potentially region-speciﬁc) demand shocks that may
aﬀect the demand for a product in particular period. Examples of such shocks include an advertising
campaign for a particular product that temporarily increases the demand for this product; the outbreak
of a (potentially region-speciﬁc) epidemic, that calls for the use of a particular drug, etc. We discuss
the interpretation and properties of this error term in more detail in the next section.
The ﬁnal form of the equation we estimate at the lower level becomes (with subscript t denoting
month, and subscript r denoting region):
ωirt = αi + αir + γii lnpirt + Σj∈D10
i [γi,10 lnpjrt]+Σj∈D01
i [γi,01 lnpjrt] (3.8)
+Σj∈D00
i [γi,00 lnpjrt]+βi ln(
XQrt
PQrt
)+εirt
The analysis so far has conditioned on the expenditure allocated to the quinolone sub-segment
XQ. The upper level of the estimation considers the problem of allocating total expenditure across
the diﬀerent systemic anti-biotics sub-segments, one of which is quinolones. The upper level demand
function is given by:
ωG = αG + ΣHγGH lnPH + βG ln(
X
P
) (3.9)
18Given the short time span of our sample, typical demand shifters, such as age distribution, income distribution,
education, etc., hardly change over our sample period. Such shifters are therefore absorbed by the region-speciﬁcp r o d u c t
ﬁxed eﬀects αir
15where all variables denoted by capital letters are deﬁned as before, but now refer to sub-segments
(G,H,...) rather than individual products within a sub-segment, and the total expenditures on systemic
anti-biotics X are deﬂated by the Stone price index logP = ΣHωH logPH. When estimating the above
system we impose all the restrictions implied by utility maximization, as we do with the estimation
of the lower level AIDS. However, we do not impose any additional restrictions on the substitution
patterns at this stage, so that the cross-price eﬀects across segments remain relatively unconstrained.
Estimation of the higher level AIDS allows us to obtain the unconditional own- and cross-price
elasticities that are used in the formulation of the supply problem and welfare analysis. These will be
given by the formula:
εij = εij|XQ=XQ +
∂ lnqi
∂ lnXQ
∂ lnXQ
∂ lnPQ
∂ lnPQ
∂ lnpj
(3.10)
with the conditional cross price elasticities given by:
εij|XQ=XQ =
⎡
⎣
γij − βi[ωj − βj ln(
XQ
PQ )]
ωi
⎤
⎦
As in the lower stage, we include sub-segment speciﬁc regional dummies in the speciﬁcation of
the upper stage demand system, so that the ﬁnal form of the estimating equation at the upper stage
becomes:
ωGrt = αG + αGr + ΣHγGH lnPHrt + βG ln(
Xrt
Prt
)+εGrt (3.11)
In sum, the demand system we take to the data is represented by equations (3.8) and (3.11), and
the associated parameter restrictions implied by economic theory.
3.2. Modelling the supply side of the market
Counterfactual simulations concerning the eﬀects of domestic product withdrawal require knowledge
of the marginal costs of pharmaceutical ﬁrms operating in the Indian market. These are unobservable.
The usual approach in the New Empirical Industrial Organization literature has been to exploit the
ﬁrm equilibrium conditions to infer marginal cost. For example, it is often assumed that the marginal
cost ci is constant and that the industry is an oligopoly engaging in Bertrand competition with
diﬀerentiated products. Assuming that ﬁrms myopically maximize proﬁts each period, one can then
derive the ﬁrms’ ﬁrst order conditions that correspond to the above assumptions about costs, market
structure, and ﬁrm behavior.
We deviate from this procedure as the presence of price regulation renders the assumption of un-
constrained period-by-period maximization untenable. Ideally, one would like to explicitly incorporate
the price and other administrative controls into the ﬁrm’s optimization problem and derive the ﬁrst
order conditions under the assumption of constrained maximization. However, the complexity of the
16price regulation makes this approach infeasible. Therefore we adopt an alternative approach that
does not rely on modelling the price setting process, but is instead based on deriving upper and lower
bound for marginal costs and markups.
In particular, an upper bound for marginal costs and a lower bound for the markups (zero) can be
derived under the assumption of perfect competition. While this assumption is clearly unrealistic in
the pharmaceuticals market, it is useful in providing an upper bound for costs cU
i ,w h i c hw i l lb eg i v e n
by:
cU
i = pi (3.12)
On the other hand, a lower bound for marginal costs cL
i (and upper bound for markups) can be
derived by assuming that there is perfect collusion within each product group i (where i refers here to
a molecule/domestic-foreign combination)19 and ignoring price controls, so that prices are determined
by the ﬁrst order condition of the jointly proﬁt maximizing ﬁrms within product group i. Solving this
ﬁrst order condition for the (lower bound of) marginal cost then gives:
cL
i = pi ∗ (1 +
1
εii(pi,pj)
) (3.13)
where εii(pi,pj), the own- price elasticity of demand for product i, will depend on the product’s own
price pi, and all other products’ prices pj,w i t hi 6= j.
Once we have obtained the demand elasticities through estimation of the demand system, we can
calculate the upper and lower bounds for marginal costs and corresponding markups according to (3.12)
or (3.13). These will then be employed in the counterfactual simulations. While our counterfactuals
use both the lower and upper bounds for costs, most of our discussion will be based on using the lower
bounds for costs, since this is the more interesting case in the policy analysis: it gives us the largest
possible proﬁts for pharmaceutical ﬁrms, and hence corresponds to the worst possible scenario facing
Indian ﬁrms and the best possible scenario facing multinationals under TRIPS.
3.3. Identiﬁcation assumptions and estimation approach
The discussion of the demand system has so far abstracted from the issue of price endogeneity. The
usual premise in the Industrial Organization literature is that correlation of prices with the error term
in the demand equation arises by virtue of the ﬁrst order conditions of proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrms.20 As
we discuss in this section, this source of simultaneity bias is unlikely to be of major concern in the
19The reason that this assumption will lead to an understatement of marginal costs (and hence overstatement of market
power) is that it assumes away competition among ﬁrms within each drug group.
20See Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) or Nevo (2001) for a related discussion.
17present context because of the existence of price regulation. Our primary concern is instead with the
simultaneity bias that is implied by the particular way prices are constructed.
To understand the sources of the simultaneity bias note ﬁrst that the price of product group pi
we employ in the demand estimation should be thought of as a proxy for an exact price index that
we do not observe. As such, pi contains by deﬁnition measurement error, and it will be correlated
with the error term of the demand equation. Speciﬁcally, the demand equation we are interested
in estimating can be written in simpliﬁed form (suppressing the subscripts r and t, and ignoring
parameter restrictions for convenience) as:
ωi = αi +
P
j
γij lnpT
j + βi ln(
XQ
PQ
)+ςi
where pT
j denotes the true (exact) price index for product group i,a n dςi captures unobserved variables
that may aﬀect demand in a particular period (e.g., an advertising campaign, an epidemic, etc.). The
price index pT
j depends on the SKU prices pk. Note that in the presence of SKU entry and exit into
the sample, the price index pT
j will vary over time, even if the prices of the individual SKUs remain
stable, as the products (SKUs) that comprise each product group change each period.
Ideally, we would like to compute the exact price index pT
j for each group and employ these indices
in the demand estimation. Under the assumption of predetermined SKU prices each period, the
exact price indices would be uncorrelated with the error term, and the demand parameters could be
estimated by simple OLS. Unfortunately, this strategy is not feasible in the current context.
To derive an exact price index for each product group it is necessary to model consumer’s choice
among SKUs conditional on the choice of the group. To this end, it is necessary to explicitly introduce a
third stage in the demand speciﬁcation and estimate the parameters associated with the choice at that
stage. However, any speciﬁcation based on 3-stage budgeting (that would require directly specifying a
demand function associated with the SKU choice at the third stage and imposing additive separability
at the higher stages) would be infeasible to estimate for three main reasons: First, there is a large
number of SKUs within some groups, so that the demand parameters cannot be estimated even if one
imposes parameter restrictions; second, the SKU prices exhibit little variation over time; lastly, the
choice sets at this lowest stage vary over time, rendering estimation of the price parameters associated
with SKUs that are not available in all periods infeasible. Alternatively, one could abandon the multi-
stage budgeting altogether, and adopt a discrete choice approach which is inherently better suited
to dealing with varying choice sets and limited price variation. A discrete choice approach would be
particularly appealing for modeling the SKU choice conditional on product group choice, given that
within each group, all SKUs contain the same molecule and are hence comparable. However, as noted
earlier, a discrete choice approach at the higher stages of the demand estimation requires converting
18revenue to physical shares, which is challenging in the case of systemic drugs, such as anti-biotics, for
which the appropriate dosage is not well deﬁned. Finally, a combination of a multi-stage budgeting
approach for the higher stages and a discrete choice approach for the lowest stage would be feasible
to estimate, but inconsistent with a model of utility maximization. For these reasons we have no
alternative but to adopt an approximation for measuring the price index for each product group.
Let us denote this approximation by pA
j ,a n dl e tµj denote the proportional “approximation” error
associated with measuring the true price index for group j,s ot h a tlnpA
j =l npT
j +lnµj. The estimating
demand equation can then be written as:
ωi = αi +
P
j
γij lnpA
j + βi ln(
XQ
PQ
) −
P
j
γij lnµj + ςi
or
ωi = αi +
P
j
γij lnpA
j + βi ln(
XQ
PQ
)+εi
where the new error term εi = −
P
j
γij lnµj +ςi is comprised of two components: the ﬁrst one reﬂects
“measurement” error due to the fact that the product group prices we employ are approximations
and not exact price indices; and the second one captures conventional demand shocks. The demand
equation as written above corresponds to the equation we take to the data.
The particular proxy we use for the exact price index for each product group j is the revenue-
share-weighted average of the prices of multiple SKUs that are available within this group, that is:
pA
j = Σk∈jωkpk
The above notation illustrates the two source of price variation: variation in the SKU prices pk,
and variation in the weights ωk.
We are concerned with potential correlation of the so-constructed product group prices with both
components of the product group demand error term. The correlation between pA
j and the ﬁrst
component −
P
j
γij lnµj, is independent of the particular way we construct pA
j , and inherent in the
fact that we measure the exact price index with error. The potential correlation between pA
j and the
second component of the product group demand error, the shock ςi , arises however because of the
speciﬁc way we construct the proxy pA
j , and in particular because of the presence of the revenue share
weights ωk in pA
j : since the SKU revenue share weights ωk will generally depend on the product group
expenditure, they are likely to be correlated with the product group demand shock ςi.
To address the simultaneity bias we use instrumental variables. To this end, we need variables
that are correlated with the proxies pA
j , but uncorrelated with the error term εi.W eu s et h en u m b e r
of SKUs within each product group j as an instrument, as it does justice to the idea that variation in
19the product group price index stems in part from variation in the set of SKUs that are available each
period. It is clearly correlated with the average group prices pA
j , and plausibly uncorrelated with the
demand shock ςi. The assumption that the number of SKUs is uncorrelated with the conventional
demand error will however be violated if the introduction of a new SKU changes the perceived quality
of a drug21, or if it is accompanied by promotional activities which will be reﬂected in ςi. Our hope is
that this is not too often the case. Assuming that the SKU number for each group j is also uncorrelated
with the weighted sum of the measurement errors of all product groups
P
j
γij lnµj, it can be used as
an instrument for the product group price pA
j
22. If one accepts the premise that prices at the SKU
level are exogenous, then SKU prices can also be used as instruments. The ﬁnal list of instruments
we use hence includes: the number of SKUs in each group, the prices of the ﬁve largest SKUs for each
group, and all other exogenous variables in the demand estimation, such as regional/product dummy
interactions and the upper-level total expenditure on anti-biotics. Regressions of group prices on the
above instruments yield high R-squares, with most regressors highly signiﬁcant, indicating that our
instruments are highly correlated with prices.23
Our sample includes four molecules: ciproﬂoxacin, norﬂoxacin, oﬂoxacin and sparﬂoxacin. Except
for sparﬂoxacin, all other molecules are produced by both foreign and domestic ﬁrms.24 So we have
seven products (domestic ciproﬂoxacin, foreign ciproﬂoxacin, etc.), with 96 observations (two years of
monthly data, four geographical regions for each period) for each product. The parameters in the lower
l e v e lA I D Sd e m a n ds y s t e ma sd e ﬁned in equation (3.8) are: the product ﬁxed eﬀects αi, the product-
regional dummy interactions αir, the own revenue-share price elasticities γii, the cross revenue-share
price elasticities γi,10,γi,01,γi,00 and the revenue-share expenditure elasticities βi.I n e s t i m a t i n g t h e
parameters, we ﬁrst regress prices on all instrumental variables, and then plug the predicted values
for prices in the constrained least-square regression (for a detailed explanation of the constraints see
the previous section).
Given that we impose many cross-equation constraints and employ instrumental variables in the
estimation, it is diﬃcult to derive standard errors for the parameter estimates analytically. Our
error term interpretation in (3.8) implies that the error terms for each product group are likely to be
correlated across regions; for example, if a national advertising campaign increases the demand for a
relatively expensive presentation in one region, simultaneously increasing the aggregate demand and
21Note that we already proxy for the quality of each product group through the product ﬁxed eﬀects αi. In the actual
estimation we actually let these ﬁxed eﬀects be region-speciﬁc( αir), so that we allow quality to vary across regions.
22If the measurement error increases in the number of included SKUs, this assumption will be violated. Unfortunately,
we have no way of checking the validity of this assumption.
23Speciﬁcally the R-squares from the ﬁrst stage regressions of product group prices on instruments range from 0.57 to
0.95, except for domestic ciproﬂoxacin, for which the R-square is 0.17.
24Sparﬂoxacin is actually oﬀered by one foreign subsidiary in India (see Table 2). However, its revenue share is
miniscule. We therefore treat Sparﬂoxacin as being produced by domestic ﬁrms only.
20price index for the corresponding product group in that region, it is likely that the same eﬀect will
be observed in other regions. In principle, we could exploit the cross-regional correlation in the error
terms to estimate the demand system using SUR. However, this would require us to analytically derive
the variance-covariance matrix of the parameters, which as noted above, is cumbersome in the current
context. Instead, we use the bootstrap method, choosing to remain agnostic about the structure of
the variance-covariance matrix. The potential disadvantage of this approach over SUR is a loss in
eﬃciency, but as will become apparent in the results section, the model parameters are fairly precisely
estimated. To maintain the market structure, we randomly sample the periods (with replacement)
and use the same periods for all products. Regarding the optimal number of bootstrap repetitions,
ideally one would follow the three-step method proposed by Andrews et al (2000). However, empirical
evidence suggests that one rarely needs more than 200 replications to estimate the standard errors25.
To be safe, we generate 300 bootstrap samples (with replacement) based on the original data, and
estimate the standard errors using the standard errors of the bootstrap sample estimates.
The estimation of the top level AIDS system is similar. The constraints imposed on this top-level
demand system are adding up, homogeneity and symmetry. Again bootstrapping is used to obtain
the standard errors of the parameter estimates.
3.4. The counterfactual scenarios
In assessing the eﬀects of patent enforcement we start by focusing on the most extreme case, in which
compulsory licensing is not an option, and foreign ﬁrms are not subject to price controls. We use the
results from the analysis of this case as a benchmark. In reality, the outcome of the WTO negotiations
is more likely to involve some constraints on the monopoly power of foreign ﬁrms selling patented
products in developing countries, such as price caps or compulsory licensing. Our framework can
easily accommodate these cases, as will become apparent in the next subsection.
We now focus on the eﬀects of potential patent enforcement in the quinolone segment. We consider
several scenarios that vary in the number and size of domestic products that will be removed from the
market. In particular, we consider the following ﬁve scenarios:26
25See Efron and Tibshirani (1993).
26As Table 2 indicates, most of the patents for the drugs in the quinolone segment have expired by now, so that none
of the scenarios described in this section is going to materialize in practice. The reason we consider these alternative
scenarios in our counterfactual simulations is to get a sense of how the presence and extent of domestic competition
aﬀects welfare calculations. Such calculations may become relevant in the future in other therapeutic classes in which
patents have not expired yet, and where domestic ﬁrms compete with foreign patent holders. While the particular exit
scenarios will depend on the exact year of patent expiry of drugs in each therapeutic class and the speciﬁc way in which
patents will be enforced (e.g., whether or not certain domestic drugs will be grandfathered in), the general conclusion
that emerges from our calculations is that the consumer welfare loss is substantially smaller in cases where some domestic
competition remains present in the market. Hence, the particular way in which patent enforcement is implemented is
essential for assessing its welfare impact.
21• withdrawal of one large domestic product group only: domestic ciproﬂoxacin
• withdrawal of one relatively small domestic product group only: domestic oﬂoxacin
• withdrawal of three domestic product groups: domestic ciproﬂoxacin, oﬂoxacin, and norﬂoxacin
• withdrawal of three domestic product groups: domestic ciproﬂoxacin, oﬂoxacin and sparﬂoxacin
• withdrawal of all four domestic quinolone product groups
As the above list suggests, we proceed from analyzing the eﬀects of single product withdrawal
to the analysis of eliminating the entire domestic segment. This approach was motivated by early
empirical results that indicated that the existence and extent of competition from domestic ﬁrms has
as i g n i ﬁcant bearing on the predicted eﬀects of patent enforcement; that is, our predictions regard-
ing prices and welfare vary substantially depending on how many domestic products are aﬀected by
patent enforcement and on whether some domestic competition will remain present after TRIPS. In
addition, the size of the aﬀected domestic groups is relevant for the welfare predictions; accordingly,
we examine both scenarios in which a large domestic product group, such as domestic ciproﬂoxacin, is
eliminated from the market, and scenarios in which the eliminated domestic group is relatively small
(e.g., domestic oﬂoxacin). In all scenarios we maintain the assumption that the set of products oﬀered
by the remaining ﬁrms in the market does not change in response to patent enforcement.
3.5. Computation of virtual prices and new equilibrium prices
The ﬁrst step in the counterfactual analysis is to derive the new equilibrium prices under patent
enforcement27. In this context there are two sets of prices that are relevant. The ﬁrst set consists of
the virtual prices of those (domestic) products that will not be available once TRIPS is put in eﬀect.
To calculate these virtual prices we set the expenditures of the relevant products equal to zero. The
second set of prices consists of the prices of those products that remain in the market. In deriving
these prices we start by assuming proﬁt maximization without any form of price regulation:t h eﬁrms
remaining in the market reoptimize in response to the policy change, and set new prices, taking the
prices of all other ﬁr m sa sg i v e n . 28 Of course, at the equilibrium all prices change in response to the
fact that some domestic products are no longer present. The new equilibrium prices for products that
27Of course, until product patents are in fact introduced, these prices will not be observable. Note also that we are
assuming here that the range of products that are available will not change with the introduction of patents.
28As mentioned above, this ﬁrst set of calculations abstracts from the existence of remaining price controls or other
government regulations that would impose constraints on the ﬁrms’ proﬁt maximization problem. Accordingly, the
resulting numbers should be interpreted as a benchmark of what would happen if markets were completely unregulated.
To examine what the welfare eﬀects of TRIPS would be in the more realistic scenario of price regulation, we subsequently
consider a scenario in which regulation keeps the prices of the products provided by patent-holders at their pre-TRIPS
level. For a more detailed discussion see the results section.
22remain in the market are thus computed by utilizing the ﬁrst order conditions of proﬁt maximizing
ﬁrms, into which the virtual prices of the eliminated products are substituted. Hence, to compute the
new equilibrium prices we solve an equation system of the following form:
• For products i that are withdrawn from the market:
0=αir + γii lnpV
ir + Σj∈D10
i [γi,10 lnp
0
jr]+Σj∈D01
i [γi,01 lnp
0
jr] (3.14)
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• For products k that remain in the market:
p
0
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1
εkk(p
0
kr,p
0
jr,pV
ir)
)−1 (3.15)
In the above equations pV
ir denotes the virtual prices of the products that are removed from the market,
while p
0
jr denotes the updated prices of all other products. Note that when solving for the virtual prices
we account for the fact that both the price index for quinolones PQr, and the expenditure allocated
to this sub-segment XQr, need to be updated to reﬂect the fact that as a result of the price changes
there may be substitution away from this sub-segment. To obtain the new quinolone expenditure X
0
Qr
and the new price index P
0
Qr, we use the estimates and formulas for the higher level AIDS system. In
equation (3.15), ck refers to the marginal cost for product k that we have obtained from the previous
estimation stage. As mentioned in the previous sub-section, we conducted the simulations using both
the upper and lower bounds for marginal cost, cu
k and cL
k respectively. The term εkk(p
0
kr,p
0
jr,pV
ir) refers
to the unconditional own price-elasticity for product k, which is a function of the eliminated products’
virtual prices and the remaining products’ new equilibrium prices. We conduct the counterfactual
simulations and welfare analysis at the regional level because the presence of region-speciﬁc product
eﬀects in the demand estimation implies region-speciﬁc demand elasticities, and hence region-speciﬁc
marginal costs and markups. The presentation and discussion of our results focus on national averages
of the relevant variables that we construct by computing weighted averages across regions, using the
p o p u l a t i o no fe a c hr e g i o na saw e i g h t .
3.6. Welfare assessment
The simulation of the new equilibrium under patent protection can provide important insights into
how consumers and ﬁrms will respond to the removal of domestic products in the market (for example,
towards which products consumers will substitute; which prices will increase the most, etc..). To get
a more precise idea of how people’s well-being will be ultimately aﬀected by TRIPS, we compute as a
23last step in our analysis the welfare eﬀects of the policy change. Social welfare is deﬁned as the sum of
domestic ﬁrm proﬁts, and consumer welfare. The change in domestic proﬁts can easily be calculated
by comparing the domestic ﬁrm (variable) proﬁts at the pre-TRIPS prices to the proﬁts these ﬁrms
will realize at the new simulated prices. Although foreign ﬁrm proﬁts do not count in domestic welfare
calculations, we also compute the eﬀects of patent enforcement on foreign ﬁrm proﬁts, to get an idea of
how large the expected beneﬁts of TRIPS for these ﬁrms are. This provides in some sense an indirect
way of assessing whether the claims that patent enforcement in countries like India will lead to more
research on developing-country-speciﬁc diseases (such as malaria) have any validity; if, for example,
we ﬁnd that the eﬀect of patent enforcement on the foreign ﬁrm proﬁts realized in India is small in
magnitude, it is unlikely that foreign ﬁrms will engage in more developing-country-speciﬁc research
in response to TRIPS. It is important to note that in all these calculations we work with the lower
bound estimates for marginal costs, since these give rise to the highest possible markups. Hence, our
estimate of proﬁt loss for domestic producers most likely overstates this loss.
On the consumer side, we measure changes in consumer welfare by the compensating variation
(CV), deﬁned as the additional expenditure that consumers need in order to achieve the same utility
level as before patent enforcement at the new prices. Speciﬁcally, let P0 denote the price vector before
patent enforcement, P
0
the simulated price vector post-TRIPS (that we obtained using the methods
described in the previous subsection), u0 the utility attained by consumers before TRIPS, and E(u,P)
the higher level expenditure function. Then the compensating variation is given by:
CV = E(u0,P
0
) − E(u0,P0 ) (3.16)
Note that the CV as computed in (3.16) represents the combination of three eﬀects:
• The pure product variety eﬀect; that is the eﬀect that arises because one or more products are
not available to consumers anymore, holding the prices of all other remaining products, and the
total expenditure on the quinolone sub-segment XQ constant.
• The expenditure switching eﬀect; that is the eﬀect arising from substitution away from quinolones,
and towards other sub-segments of the anti-biotics market, again holding the prices of all other
remaining products constant.
• The reduced competition eﬀect; that is the eﬀect that arises because the ﬁrms remaining in the
market adjust (increase) their prices in response to the removal of domestic products.
From both an analytical and a policy point of view, it is desirable to assess how large each of the
above eﬀects is. Accordingly, we decompose the total eﬀect on consumer welfare (the CV as given by
equation (3.16)), using the following procedure:
24To get the pure product variety eﬀect, we compute virtual prices for the products that are removed
from the market holding the quinolone expenditure XQ and the prices of all other products ﬁxed.
Let us call the resulting price vector P1. Then the pure product variety eﬀect is represented by
E(u0,P1) − E(u0,P0 ).
To compute the expenditure switching eﬀect, we compute another set of virtual prices, again
holding the prices of all remaining products ﬁxed, but letting quinolone expenditure adjust in response
to the new price index for the quinolone segment (given that the prices of the remaining products
remain ﬁxed, the change in the price index arises only because of the removal of one or more domestic
products). Note that this scenario most closely resembles the case in which patent laws are enforced,
but strict price regulation keeps the prices of the products oﬀered in the market at their pre-TRIP level.
Let us label the so-computed price vector P2. The expenditure switching eﬀect is then E(u0,P2) −
E(u0,P1).
Finally, the reduced competition eﬀect arising from higher prices for the remaining products is com-
puted as the residual change in the compensating variation once the product variety and expenditure
eﬀects have been accounted for, that is E(u0,P
0
) − E(u0,P2), where the price vector P
0
is computed
according to the formulas (3.14) and (3.15) to reﬂect the adjustment of prices to the new regime.
To compute the standard errors associated with the counterfactual simulations (that is the standard
errors for the counterfactual prices and welfare estimates), we again use bootstrapping: We ﬁrst
bootstrap the original sample (sales and prices of all the drugs) 300 times. Next, we estimate the
AIDS model for each of these samples, and compute the counterfactual equilibrium prices and welfare
losses corresponding to each policy scenario for each of the 300 simulations. In the ﬁnal step, we
compute standard errors29.
One limitation of our framework is that it does not allow for a heterogeneous response of consumers
to the policy change. Accordingly, our framework is not suited to addressing the question of how
diﬀerent groups in the population will be aﬀected by patent law enforcement.30 Along the same
lines, our framework does not accommodate the possibility of price discrimination, which might lead
to diﬀerent results regarding welfare losses and proﬁt gains relative to uniform pricing31.S t i l l , w e
believe that the results of the counterfactual simulations can provide important insights into the likely
aggregate response to patent enforcement and the factors that drive this response.
29In cases some of the simulations do not converge, we compute the standard errors using only those simulations that
converged.
30Addressing this question would require at a minimum micro data on consumer purchases as in Goldberg (1995). To
our knowledge such data do not exist for the Indian pharmaceutical market.
31See Berndt (1994) for an extensive discussion of uniform pricing.
254. Results
4.1. The structure of demand
Tables A2 and A3 in the Appendix display the results from estimation of the lower- and upper-level
AIDS system respectively. For ease of interpretation, rather than discussing the coeﬃcient estimates,
we focus our discussion on the implied unconditional price and expenditure elasticities reported in
Table 6. Given that the region-speciﬁc product group eﬀects αir reported in the last four columns
of Tables A2 and A3 imply region-speciﬁc demand elasticities, we report separate elasticities for each
region in Tables 6(a) and 6(b). As evident from the comparison of these tables, the elasticities are
very similar across regions, so that we can focus the remaining discussion on the elasticities of one
region only, the Northern region, displayed in Table 6(a).
The diagonal terms of Table 6(a) report the own price elasticities, which are, in all but one
case, negative and highly signiﬁcant. The one exception is the foreign norﬂoxacin product group–
whose share of quinolone sales is 0.07%–for which we estimate a negative but insigniﬁcant own price
elasticity. For the remaining product groups, demand appears to be highly elastic, with the estimated
elasticities being lower than -2 in four out of the six cases. The magnitude of the own-price elasticities
matches the features of the Indian pharmaceutical market mentioned earlier, which would suggest
that Indian consumers are likely to be quite price-sensitive.32The elasticities appear especially large
if one takes into account that they refer to product groups (such as domestic ciproﬂoxacin) and not
individual drugs oﬀered by particular ﬁrms. Their relative magnitudes are also intuitive: the drug with
the largest market share and a relatively high price (domestic ciproﬂoxacin) appears to be one of the
least elastic. In contrast, foreign ciproﬂoxacin is highly price elastic; this is plausible as ciproﬂoxacin
drugs oﬀered by subsidiaries of multinationals face the stiﬀest competition in this market segment
from approximately 75 Indian ﬁrms oﬀering the same molecule.
The estimated expenditure elasticities appear in the last column. These are all positive, indicating
that the demand for all product groups is normal. The remaining cells display the estimated cross-
price elasticities. As one might perhaps expect for products within a therapeutic sub-segment, these
are mostly positive. Out of a total of 49 price elasticities we estimate, there are 6 that do not conform
to expectations; these are the cross-price elasticities between diﬀerent foreign product groups, that
are estimated to be negative and signiﬁcant.33 Fortunately, these elasticities have negligible impact
32In developed economies, elasticities of this magnitude have typically only been found for generic drugs (and even
then, only rarely) or among consumers who lack health insurance.
33While these elasticities are clearly counterintuitive, they are not inconsistent with the underlying demand system,
which imposes no restrictions on the sign of the cross-price elasticities. We do not have a good explanation of why these
elasticities are estimated to be negative. A potential explanation is that the shares of the foreign products are very small;
given this, we observe very few consumers switching from one (very small) foreign group to another (very small) foreign
group, when the price of the ﬁrst foreign group goes up, and hence the inference is not very reliable in this case.
26on the welfare analysis: given that our counterfactuals focus on the eﬀect of withdrawing one or more
domestic products from the market, the most relevant elasticities are the ones which capture the
response of various product group shares to a change in the price of one or more domestic groups;
these elasticities are the cross-price elasticities between various domestic groups, and the ones between
domestic and foreign groups, which are plausible and precisely estimated34.
Regarding these elasticities, a striking aspect of our estimates is how large, positive and signiﬁcant
the cross-price elasticities between diﬀerent domestic product groups are–in fact, for norﬂoxacin and
oﬂoxacin we estimate that domestic product groups containing diﬀerent molecules are closer substitutes
for one another than product groups that contain the same molecule but are produced by foreign ﬁrms.
In contrast, for ciproﬂo x a c i n( t h em o l e c u l ew i t ht h el a r g e s tr e v e n u es h a r e )w ee s t i m a t eal a r g ep o s i t i v e
cross-price elasticity between the domestic and foreign versions.
The fact that domestic products appear to be close substitutes for other domestic products that
contain diﬀerent molecules truly represents an “empirical” ﬁnding in the sense that we do not impose
it through any of our assumptions regarding the demand function. The question that naturally arises
then, is what might explain this ﬁnding. While we cannot formally address this question, anecdotal
accounts in various industry studies suggest that the explanation may lie in the diﬀerences between
domestic and foreign ﬁrms in the structure and coverage of retail distribution networks.
Distribution networks for pharmaceuticals in India are typically organized in a hierarchical fashion.
Pharmaceutical companies deal mainly with carrying and forwarding (C&F) agents, in many instances
regionally based, who each supply a network of stockists (wholesalers). These stockists in turn deal
with the retail pharmacists through whom retail sales ultimately occur.35 The market share enjoyed
by a particular pharmaceutical product therefore depends in part on the number of retail pharmacists
who stock the product. And it is here that there appears to be a distinction between domestic ﬁrms
and multinational subsidiaries. In particular, the retail reach of domestic ﬁrms, as a group, tends to
be much more comprehensive than that of multinational subsidiaries (ICRA (1999)).36
34The cross-price elasticities between foreign drug groups containing diﬀerent molecules will also have an eﬀect on
the welfare estimates, given that the withdrawal of domestic products will generally lead to changes in the prices of all
foreign products, and market shares will be reallocated from some foreign products to other foreign products based on
the new prices. However, this reallocation from “foreign to foreign” is truly second order in our case, compared to the
reallocation from “domestic to domestic”, and “domestic to foreign” products. In scenarios in which we consider patent
enforcement accompanied by strict price regulation, the cross-price elasticities between foreign product groups are in fact
completely irrelevant, as the prices of foreign products are not allowed to increase in these cases. Still, our welfare loss
estimates remain substantial, driven — as before — by the loss of product variety.
35T h e r ea r ee s t i m a t e dt ob es o m e3 0 0 , 0 0 0r e t a i lp h a r m a c i s t si nI n d i a . O na v e r a g es t o c k i s t sd e a lw i t ha b o u t7 5
retailers (ICRA (1999)). There are naturally variations in this structure, and a host of speciﬁce x c l u s i v ed e a l i n ga n d
other arrangements exist in practice. Pharmaceutical ﬁrms also maintain networks of medical representatives whose main
function is to market the company’s products to doctors who do the actual prescribing of drugs. In some instances, ﬁrms
do sell directly to the doctors who then become the “retailer” as far as patients are concerned, but these are relatively
rare.
36These diﬀerences were also highlighted in conversations that one of the authors had with CEOs and Managing
27There appear to be two reasons for this. The ﬁrst is that many of the larger Indian ﬁrms, because
they have a much larger portfolio of products over which to spread the associated ﬁxed costs, typically
have more extensive networks of medical representatives. The second is simply that there are many
more domestic ﬁrms (and products) on the market. At the retail level this would imply that local
pharmacists might be more likely to stock domestic products containing two diﬀerent molecules, say
ciproﬂoxacin and norﬂoxacin, than they would domestic and foreign versions of the same molecule. To
the extent that patients (or their doctors) are willing to substitute across molecules in order to save
on transport or search costs (e.g., going to another pharmacy to check whether a particular foreign
product is in stock), in aggregate data we would expect to ﬁnd precisely the substitution patterns that
we report in Table 6.
Whether or not the particular explanation we provide above is the correct one, the high degree
of substitutability between domestic product groups turns out to have important implications for
the welfare calculations. We discuss these in more detail below when we present the results of the
counterfactual welfare analysis. Another elasticity with important implications for the counterfactuals
is the price elasticity for the quinolone sub-segment as a whole, which indicates how likely consumers
are to switch to other anti-biotics groups, when faced with a price increase for quinolones. This
elasticity is computed on the basis of the results in Table A3, and it is at -1.11 (standard error: 0.24)
large in magnitude, but — as expected — smaller in absolute value than the own-price elasticities of the
product groups within the quinolone sub-segment.
The results in Tables 6(a) and 6(b) are based on our preferred speciﬁcation discussed in Section 3.
In Tables A4-A6 in the Appendix we experimented with some alternative speciﬁcations. Tables A4(a)-
A4(c) correspond to a speciﬁcation that includes in addition to product-group-speciﬁcr e g i o n a lﬁxed
eﬀects, product-group-speciﬁc (and for the upper level antibiotics-segment-speciﬁc) seasonal eﬀects.
We distinguish between 3 seasons: the Summer, Monsoon, and Winter, and report the unconditional
demand elasticities for the Northern region for each of these seasons. As evident from the tables in
the Appendix, our elasticity estimates are robust to the inclusion of seasonal eﬀects. The demand
elasticities in Table A5 are based on estimation of the demand system by OLS. Compared to the
elasticities obtained by IV, the OLS elasticities are smaller in absolute value implying that welfare
calculations based on the OLS estimates would produce larger welfare loss estimates. Nevertheless,
some of the patterns regarding the cross-price elasticities discussed earlier are also evident in the OLS
results; in particular, the cross-price elasticities between diﬀerent domestic product groups are all
positive, large, and signiﬁcant, and in most instances larger than the cross-price elasticities between
drugs that contain the same molecule but are produced by ﬁrms of diﬀerent domestic/foreign status.
The close substitutability of domestic products indicated by both the OLS and IV estimates seems to
Directors of several pharmaceutical ﬁr m sa sp a r to fas e p a r a t es t u d y .
28be one of the most robust ﬁndings of the paper.
4.2. Cost and markup estimates
Table 7 displays the marginal costs, markups and proﬁts implied by the price elasticity estimates
of Tables 6(a) and 6(b) for each of the seven product groups. Given that our regional eﬀects imply
diﬀerent price elasticities for each region, our marginal cost and markup estimates also diﬀer by region.
However, given that based on Tables 6(a) and 6(b) the price elasticities do not seem to substantially
diﬀer across regions, we report for ease of exposition only the national averages for marginal costs and
markups in Table 7.
Table 7 has two parts. In the left part (ﬁrst three columns) we report the lower bound for marginal
cost and the corresponding upper bound for markup, and upper bound for total annual proﬁtf o re a c h
product group. These numbers are based on the price elasticities we obtained from estimating the
2-level AIDS demand system. Since we do not have a reliable estimate for the price elasticity of foreign
norﬂoxacin (the point estimate is negative, but less than 1 in absolute value, and insigniﬁcant), we
cannot compute the lower bound for marginal cost in this case. It is important to note that these esti-
mates do not reﬂect either the actual marginal cost or the actual markup for these drugs, both because
the existence of price regulation implies that the unconstrained ﬁrst order conditions are unlikely to
hold each period, and because our aggregation across ﬁrms of the same domestic/foreign status sup-
plying the same molecule makes the interpretation of these estimates problematic. In particular, the
fact that we ignore competition among ﬁrms within each product group implies that our estimates
will tend to overstate market power. However, these numbers will prove useful in the counterfactual
simulations as they can give us a sense of how large the maximum proﬁt gains for multinationals and
the maximum proﬁt losses for domestic ﬁrms are likely to be under patent enforcement. The right
part of the table (last three columns) reports the upper bound for marginal cost which we obtain by
simply taking the marginal cost to be equal to the observed price. We do not report standard errors in
this case since the numbers are based on actual data. The markups corresponding to these marginal
cost upper bounds are of course zero. We conduct the counterfactual simulations using both the lower
and upper bounds for marginal costs.
The (upper bounds for) markups on the left side of the table are generally plausible. The domestic
ciproﬂoxacin product group that dominates the quinolone sub-segment, and for which we documented
high prices, a high market share, and a relatively low elasticity of demand, enjoys one of the highest
markup upper bounds (60%) and accounts for nearly 70% of all proﬁts derived within the sub-segment.
Foreign ciproﬂoxacin on the other hand, which faces the stiﬀest competition from domestic ﬁrms, and
for which we estimated a highly elastic demand, has the lowest markup upper bound (19%).
294.3. Counterfactual estimates of the impact on prices and welfare
With estimates of the key demand and cost parameters in hand, we turn to the counterfactuals. We
consider the ﬁve separate scenarios listed in the previous section. All of the scenarios involve the
withdrawal of one or more of the domestic product groups from the market. Table 8 displays our
estimates of the consumer welfare losses that result under the diﬀerent scenarios. The losses are
expressed in billion Rs. per year. All numbers presented in Table 8 and subsequent tables are based
on using the lower bounds for marginal cost and upper bounds for markup in the simulations. As
discussed earlier, these numbers are the more interesting to work with, since they give us an upper
bound for the changes in the proﬁts of domestic and foreign ﬁrms that would result from patent
enforcement. In the Appendix we also present results based on using the upper bounds for marginal
costs in the simulations, in which case the pre-TRIPS proﬁts of domestic and foreign ﬁrms are zero. In
all cases, marginal costs are assumed to be constant in output. While naturally the proﬁti m p l i c a t i o n s
diﬀer depending on whether one uses the upper or lower bounds for marginal costs (ﬁrm proﬁts are
zero if one assumes the upper bound of marginal cost, in which case price equals marginal cost), the
estimated consumer welfare losses are similar in the two cases. We discuss these results at the end of
this section in more detail.
The ﬁrst column presents our estimates of the consumer welfare losses attributable to the pure
loss of product variety eﬀect, where we ﬁx the prices of all remaining products as well as the overall
expenditure on quinolones while withdrawing one or more of the domestic product groups. Note that
h a dw en o t ,i no u ri n i t i a ls p e c i ﬁcation of the demand system, allowed for the possibility that consumers
might diﬀerentiate between domestic and foreign products even when they contain the same molecule,
this particular component of the loss of consumer welfare would not have arisen.
The estimates reported in the second column incorporate the expenditure switching eﬀect on top
of the loss of product variety. Here, based upon the price elasticity estimates from the higher-level
AIDS system, we adjust (downwards) the expenditures allocated to the quinolone sub-segment as the
composite price of quinolones eﬀectively increases as a consequence of the higher virtual prices of the
domestic product groups that are withdrawn from the market. Because the estimates in this column
are generated assuming that the prices of the products that remain in the market are not adjusted
upwards, they provide a sense of what consumer losses would be if the introduction of product patents
was coupled with strict price-regulation aimed at maintaining prices at pre-patent levels. Alternatively,
they can be thought of as the relevant welfare numbers if intense competition among ﬁrms within the
remaining product groups kept the prices of the products that were still oﬀered in the market close to
the ﬁrms’ marginal costs.
The last column displays the estimated consumer welfare losses when both cross-segment expenditure-
switching and within-segment upward price adjustments are taken into account.
30If we compare the results across the ﬁrst, second and third columns, all the counterfactual scenarios
produce qualitatively similar patterns, patterns that are consistent with what we would expect. Start-
ing from the initial loss of welfare attributable to the loss of product variety, the option of switching
expenditures out of the quinolone sub-segment to other sub-segments mitigates some of the initial
welfare loss. But if we then incorporate the upward price adjustments that result in response to the
reduced competition, the welfare losses are magniﬁed.
Of particular interest from a policy perspective are the relative magnitudes of these three eﬀects,
which are similar under all the counterfactual scenarios though the absolute levels vary considerably.
First, despite the fact that the demand for quinolones is quite sensitive to the composite price of
quinolones–the upper level price elasticity is -1.11–the cross-sub-segment expenditure switching ef-
fects are, in all the cases, small (in absolute value terms) relative to the other two eﬀects. For instance,
under the scenario where all the domestic quinolone product groups are withdrawn from the market,
the overall consumer welfare loss of Rs. 17.81 billion per year can be decomposed into an initial loss of
Rs. 11.76 billion (66%) attributable to the loss of product variety, a slight reduction in this initial loss
of Rs. 0.41 billion (-2%), from Rs. 11.76 billion to Rs. 11.35 billion, because of expenditure switching,
and a subsequent additional loss of Rs. 6.46 billion (36%), from Rs. 11.35 billion to Rs. 17.81 billion,
because of the reduced competition and consequent price increases.
The basic claim made by proponents of TRIPS is that any adverse impacts on consumer welfare
from the introduction of a product patent in a particular market will be mitigated by the availability of
close therapeutic substitutes. The relatively minor role that cross-sub-segment expenditure switching
appears to play suggests that for this claim to be valid, there need to be unpatented (i.e., patent-
expired) substitutes available within fairly narrowly deﬁned therapeutic categories. Since the extent
to which this is true will vary across therapeutic segments, the impact of TRIPS is likely to be
correspondingly variegated, a point emphasized by Maskus (2000, p.163).
Price regulation and compulsory licensing are two of the most widely mentioned post-TRIPS policy
options available to governments of developing economies. There is an ongoing debate about how much
leeway governments should have to introduce these options and about the relative eﬃcacy of the two
options in limiting price increases. The magnitude and importance of the welfare losses we estimate
from the loss of product variety suggest that there may be an independent role for compulsory licensing
in addition to or in lieu of price regulation for the sole purpose of mitigating the loss of product variety.
Turning next to a comparison of the consumer welfare losses under the diﬀerent scenarios the most
striking result is that the estimated loss of consumer welfare (Rs. 17.81 billion) from the simultaneous
withdrawal of all four domestic product groups–the scenario that most closely resembles what is
likely to happen under TRIPS–is more than two times the sum of the estimated losses from the four
31separate scenarios in each of which only one of the domestic product groups is withdrawn.37 What this
very clearly indicates is that past studies that have estimated the aggregate eﬀects of patent protection
by adding up the losses, estimated separately, in each of a number of patentable markets may have
substantially underestimated the magnitude of the consumer welfare losses from the introduction of
pharmaceutical product patents.
T h er e s u l tt h a tt h esimultaneous withdrawal of all domestic products magniﬁes the scale of the
welfare losses is driven by our estimates of high, positive cross-price elasticities between domestic
products. As noted earlier, these elasticities imply that such products are close substitutes to one
another. Hence, when all four domestic products disappear from the market, the resulting consumer
loss is substantial. In contrast, the welfare losses associated with the withdrawal of a single domestic
product or a subset of domestic products are more modest; with domestic product groups within the
quinolone sub-segment being relatively good substitutes, if only one of them is withdrawn, consumers
switch to the others, and this limits any welfare losses.
We should note that if, as we speculated above, the high degree of substitutability between do-
mestic products stems in part from the diﬀerential reach of the distribution networks of domestic and
foreign ﬁrms, these estimates may overstate the welfare loss from the simultaneous withdrawal of all
domestic products. That is because, with India becoming TRIPS compliant, foreign subsidiaries may
well choose to expand their product portfolios in India and simultaneously expand their distribution
networks in India, most likely through joint marketing ventures with Indian ﬁrms. Media accounts
and interviews with industry sources indicate that such initiatives are increasing in number. In this
case, the welfare loss from the reduction in variety would be a purely transitional phenomenon. Over
time, foreign products would be more readily available in local pharmacies throughout India and this
would compensate for the reduction in the number of domestic products. Alternatively, if Indian con-
sumers insist in buying products produced by Indian ﬁrms, foreign multinationals could use licensing
to recover the welfare loss associated with the loss of variety. Note however, that even under this
scenario, the component of consumer welfare loss due to upward price adjustment remains. And a
crude calculation based on the estimates in the last row of Table 8 suggests that this is likely to be
signiﬁcant. In particular, if we subtract from our estimate of the overall consumer welfare loss (Rs.
17.81 billion), the component attributable to the reduction in variety taking into account expenditure
switching (Rs. 11.35 billion), we are still left with an estimated welfare loss of Rs. 6.46 billion. Given
the size of the welfare loss due to upward price adjustment policymakers may be tempted to continue
37For ease of exposition, Table 8 reports only a subset of the scenarios we have investigated. The consumer welfare loss
associated with the withdrawal of domestic norﬂoxacin only (not reported in Table 8) is approximately Rs. 0.1 billion;
the welfare loss associated with the withdrawal of sparﬂoxacin only is close to zero. Hence, the sum of the estimated
welfare losses from the scenarios in which only one domestic product is withdrawn is (7.32+0.23+0.1 +0) = Rs. 7.6
billion per year.
32the use of price controls and other domestic regulations. However, such policies would put a limit not
only on prices, but also on the incentives of foreign producers to expand their operations in the Indian
market, so that the welfare loss due to the reduction of product variety could become a permanent
phenomenon.
Table 9 documents our estimates of the price increases that would result under the various coun-
terfactual scenarios. The table reports the price increases for the product groups, foreign or domestic,
that would remain in the market under each of our scenarios. The groups that are withdrawn from the
market are indicated by the shaded areas. For the foreign products that would remain in the market,
we estimate price increases between 100% and 400%. While these numbers are based on simulations,
and thus not observed, we can obtain a rough idea about their plausibility by comparing them to
the prices of the same products observed in countries “similar” to India in terms of demographics,
but which have less competitive domestic markets. Pakistan is a natural candidate. For the drug
ciproﬂoxacin, for example, we predict that the price of the (patented) foreign products in India would
be approximately 5 times higher than it is now (see last row of Table 9, ﬁrst column; the relevant
scenario here is one where all domestic products are withdrawn from the market, since this is the sit-
uation that most closely resembles Pakistan). Lanjouw (1998), p. 39, Table 2, reports that the price
of ciproﬂoxacin in Pakistan is about 7 times the price of the same drug in India. The two numbers
are of similar order of magnitude, though our estimate is on the low side. These comparisons give us
conﬁdence that the empirical framework we use as a basis for conducting counterfactual simulations
in India captures the main features of this market.
Table 10 presents our estimates of the net impact of the withdrawal of one or more domestic
product groups on the collective proﬁts of domestic Indian ﬁrms in the quinolone sub-segment. Under
the scenario where all the domestic product groups are withdrawn from the market, the net impact
equals the gross impact and is simply the loss of the proﬁts initially enjoyed by domestic ﬁrms: Rs.
2.34 billion per year. In the other cases, the foregone proﬁts of those domestic ﬁrms whose products
are withdrawn from the market are partly or wholly oﬀset by the increased proﬁts of those domestic
ﬁr m st h a tr e m a i ni nt h em a r k e ta n db e n e ﬁt from the reduced competition. From Table 10 it can be
seen that this latter result arises when domestic oﬂoxacin is withdrawn from the market, in which case
consumers switch to other domestic drugs within quinolones, increasing the proﬁts of the domestic
ﬁrms selling those drugs.38
Critics of the Indian government’s stance on TRIPS frequently assert that it is motivated less
by concerns about consumer welfare than it is by a desire to protect the domestic pharmaceutical
industry. Whether or not that is the case, the estimates presented in Table 10 indicate that the
38To be consistent with Table 8, which reported consumer welfare losses as positive numbers, Table 10 reports foregone
proﬁts as positive numbers. Thus, if the collective proﬁts of domestic Indian ﬁrms actually increase, negative numbers
are reported.
33loss of domestic producer surplus is unlikely to be the biggest consequence of TRIPS-induced patent
protection. First, as just mentioned, there are scenarios under which the collective proﬁts of domestic
ﬁrms would actually go up, though there always is a segment that would be adversely aﬀected.39
Second, even when the collective proﬁts do go down, a comparison with Table 8 indicates that the loss
of consumer welfare is much greater in every instance. And under the scenario where the collective
loss of proﬁts is the greatest and there are no winners among the domestic Indian ﬁrms, the loss
incurred by producers–Rs. 2.3 billion on an annualized basis–pales in comparison to the decrease in
consumer welfare reported in Table 8 under the same scenario–Rs. 17.81 billion annually, especially
if one takes into account that the proﬁt loss of Rs. 2.3 billion, was derived by using an upper bound for
the domestic ﬁrms’ Pre-TRIPS markups, and hence clearly overstates the proﬁt loss that the domestic
sector would actually incur.40
Table A6 in the Appendix reports results from counterfactual simulations in which we used the
upper bound for marginal costs. The pre-TRIPS domestic ﬁrm proﬁts are of course zero in this case,
since the upper bound was derived by setting marginal cost equal to price. Interestingly, the results in
Table A6 that report the loss in consumer welfare, indicate that the consumer loss would be slightly
higher than before. This is due to the fact that due to the higher marginal cost estimates, the price
increases are now higher compared to the case where the lower bound of marginal cost was used. The
new consumer welfare loss estimate is however roughly of the same order of magnitude as before, so
we focus the rest of our discussion on the results we obtained by using the lower bound of marginal
cost.
Adding up the estimates of consumer welfare losses from Table 8 and producer losses from Table 10
we get estimates of the total welfare losses to the Indian economy. These are reported in Table 11. At
the upper bound we estimate that in the absence of any price regulation or compulsory licensing the
total annual welfare losses to the Indian economy from the withdrawal of just four domestic product
groups in the quinolone sub-segment would be on the order of Rs. 20.16 billion, which translates at
the then prevailing exchange rate into a ﬁgure of U.S. $450 million.
Given that in practice the simultaneous enforcement of intellectual property rights and elimination
of price controls is unlikely, a more realistic estimate of the welfare loss can be obtained by assuming
that price regulation will prevent upward price adjustments as a result of product withdrawals. This
gives us a mid-range estimate of Rs. 13.7 billion or about U.S. $305 million per year for the scenario
39This may in part explain why the Indian pharmaceutical industry has been divided in its reaction to TRIPS. The
Organization of Pharmaceutical Producers of India, which includes among its members most of the leading Indian
ﬁrms as well the subsidiaries of foreign MNCs, is openly supportive of strengthening India’s intellectual property rights
regime (http://www.indiaoppi.com/). Other industry associations such as the Indian Drug Manufacturers Association
with memberships drawn from smaller ﬁrms tend to be more critical of TRIPS.
40There are other factors as well that might serve to mitigate the losses experienced by Indian ﬁrms, among them the
possibility of joint ventures with, or contract manufacturing for multinationals. Such collaborations are increasing in
frequency in the Indian pharmaceutical industry.
34involving withdrawal of all four domestic quinolone product groups. Of this amount, foregone proﬁts
of domestic producers constitute roughly Rs. 2.3 billion, or U.S. $50 million (ca. 16% of the total
welfare loss). The overwhelming portion of the total welfare loss therefore derives from the loss of
consumer welfare.
Lastly, if we assume that the welfare losses due to the reduction in variety are a purely transitional
phenomenon or that they could be neutralized through expanded use of licensing, and subtract these
from our upper bound estimates, we obtain a lower bound estimate of Rs. 6.5 billion (=20.16-13.7) or
$144 million annually. Though only about 30% of our upper bound estimate, in absolute terms this
lower bound estimate is still very large, representing about 24% of antibiotic sales in 2000.
Finally, Table 12 presents our estimates of the proﬁt gains realized by foreign producers as a result
of patent introduction. These estimates indicate that the total proﬁt gains to foreign producers would
be only about Rs. 2.4 billion or approximately U.S. $53 million per year. More importantly, the
U.S. $53 million per year estimate corresponds to the rather unrealistic case where there is no price
regulation, so that multinationals are free to adjust their prices upward in response to the reduced
competition. In the presence of price regulation that would keep prices ﬁxed at their pre-patent-
enforcement level (column 2 in Table 12), the proﬁt gain for foreign multinationals becomes Rs. 0.88
billion, or U.S. $19.6 million per year, only. To put the above numbers in perspective, sales of Cipro
alone, the main patented ciproﬂoxacin product of Bayer, were roughly U.S. $1.6 billion in 2000 (Hensley
(2001)). Assuming a 40% markup (the markup usually quoted for the pharmaceutical industry), this
translates to annual proﬁts of roughly U.S. $640 million per year, for Bayer’s Cipro alone.
5. Conclusion
The results of our analysis suggest that concerns about the potentially adverse welfare eﬀects of
TRIPS in developing countries may have some basis. Speciﬁcally, we estimate that in the quinolone
sub-segment of the systemic anti-bacterials segment alone, patent enforcement would result in a large
welfare loss for the Indian economy. The estimated loss ranges from $144 million to an upper bound of
$450 million annually, depending on the way policies are implemented, the extent of price regulation,
and the degree to which foreign multinationals respond to patent protection by expanding their dis-
tribution networks or using licensing more extensively. Of this amount, only a small fraction accounts
for the forgone proﬁts of domestic (Indian) pharmaceutical ﬁrms. Hence, we do not ﬁnd much support
for the claim that TRIPS would have detrimental eﬀects on the Indian pharmaceutical industry. In
fact, under some scenarios we ﬁnd that the proﬁts of domestic ﬁrms may even increase;t h i sh a p p e n s
because, when certain domestic products become unavailable as a result of patent enforcement, con-
sumers substitute towards other domestic products containing diﬀerent molecules, rather than foreign
products containing the same molecule. This diﬀerential eﬀect of TRIPS on domestic ﬁrms’ proﬁts
35may partly explain the divided position of the Indian pharmaceutical industry regarding TRIPS.
With respect to the subsidiaries of foreign multinationals, we estimate the proﬁt gains of these
ﬁrms to be approximately U.S. $53 million per year when patents are enforced. This is in the absence
of compulsory licensing or price regulation. With price regulation that would keep the prices of drugs
supplied by multinational subsidiaries at their pre-TRIPS level, the proﬁt gains drop to only U.S. $19.6
million per year. While we certainly do not attempt to draw any conclusions about the relationship
between intellectual property rights protection and research and innovation, we note that this number
represents a very small fraction of the annual sales of big pharmaceutical ﬁrms in this sub-segment.
By far, the biggest eﬀects of TRIPS concern the Indian consumers, for whom we estimate sub-
stantial welfare losses. The losses increase in the number of domestic products that are aﬀected by
TRIPS. The worst case scenario involves simultaneous withdrawal of all domestic product groups in
the quinolone sub-segment. In contrast, when only one domestic product, or a subset of domestic
products are withdrawn, the consumer losses are modest. This pattern is driven by the empirical
ﬁnding that domestic products are viewed by Indian consumers as close substitutes; accordingly, the
existence of some degree of domestic competition has a big impact on consumer well-being.
Finally, our decomposition of the total consumer loss into a “product variety” eﬀect, an “expen-
diture switching” eﬀect, and a “price adjustment” eﬀect, has interesting policy implications. We
ﬁnd that a substantial fraction of the total welfare loss is attributable to the loss of variety, which
we interpret as primarily capturing an “ease of access” eﬀect: because the retail coverage of domestic
ﬁrms in India is substantially more extensive than the one of foreign multinationals, drugs produced
by domestic ﬁrms are more readily available to Indian consumers than drugs sold by foreign producers.
This suggests a potentially independent role of compulsory licensing in addition to, or in lieu of price
regulation, for the sole purpose of mitigating the loss of product variety eﬀect. Even if one considers
this eﬀect to be only a transitional phenomenon that will diminish in importance as foreign ﬁrms
respond to TRIPS enforcement by expanding their product portfolios and distribution networks, or by
using licensing more extensively, the welfare loss due to upward price adjustment remains substantial.
The “price adjustment” component of welfare loss could potentially be mitigated by appropriate price
controls or other regulations. However in this case, the incentives of multinationals to expand their
operations in the Indian market would become questionable, and the welfare loss attributable to the
loss of product variety could become a permanent eﬀect.
In general, our simulations indicate that from a consumer welfare point of view the issue of product
availability is as important as the issue of aﬀordability. In this sense our analysis suggests that policy
makers should evaluate TRIPS related policies not only in terms of their eﬀects on drug prices, but
also in terms of their impact on product availability. This observation is more relevant the more
likely it is that there will be tension between policies designed towards addressing these two sets of
36eﬀects. Intellectual property rights enforcement without price regulation is likely to bolster foreign
ﬁrms’ incentives to market their products in developing countries and use licensing more extensively
than in the past, but it brings with it the potential of substantial price increases of patented products.
Accompanying price regulation can prevent patent holders from exploiting their market power but not
without diminishing the incentives of such ﬁrms to expand their operations in the developing world. A
combination of policies that would completely neutralize TRIPS’ adverse eﬀects on consumer welfare
is hence unlikely.
Lastly, we ﬁnd that expenditure switching across sub-segments has a limited role in containing
consumer welfare loss. The claim of TRIPS proponents that any adverse eﬀects arising from the intro-
duction of a patent in a particular market would be mitigated by the availability of close therapeutic
substitutes is thus only valid if there are patent-expired substitutes available within fairly narrowly
deﬁned therapeutic categories.
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Table 1 
The Quinolones Sub-segment  
 
Shares (%) of Quinolones Sales  Sales (Rs. Mill): 2000 
Molecule  Domestic 
Firms 
Foreign 
Subsidiaries 
Domestic 
Firms 
Foreign 
Subsidiaries 
Ciprofloxacin   53.0 2.7  3,030  156 
Norfloxacin  11.2 0.1 640  3 
Ofloxacin  11.6 3.1 665 177 
Sparfloxacin  10.8 0.1 620  4 
      
Lomefloxacin  1.5 . 86 . 
Pefloxacin  1.3 0.1 72  5 
Levofloxacin  0.0 .  0  . 
Nalidixic acid  1.3 . 73 . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Basic Information about the Four Quinolones Molecules: 2000 
 
 Ciprofloxacin  Norfloxacin  Ofloxacin  Sparfloxacin 
 
U.S. or European Patent Holder  Bayer Merck Ortho-McNeil Rhone-Poulenc
Year of U.S. Patent Expiry  2003 1998 2003 2010
Year of US-FDA Approval  1987 1986 1990 1996
Year First Introduced in India  1989 1988 1990 1996
 
No. of Domestic Indian Firms  75 40 17 25
No. of Foreign Subsidiaries  822  1
 
Sales Weighted Average Per-unit API* Price of Products Produced by:  
Domestic Indian Firms  11.24 9.05 90.08 78.84
Foreign Subsidiaries  10.35 5.28 108.47 .
 
*API: Active pharmaceutical ingredient. Table 3 
Summary Statistics for the Quinolones Sub-segment: 1999 - 2000 
 
  North East  West  South 
31.25 19.75  27.64  23.59  Annual Quinolones Expenditure Per 
Household (Rs.)  (3.66) (3.67)  (4.07)  (2.86) 
 
119.88 84.24  110.52  96.24  Annual Anti-Biotics Expenditure Per 
Household (Rs.)  (12.24) (12.24)  (9.60)  (9.96) 
No. of SKUs:  
12.38 11.29  13.08  12.46 
Foreign Ciprofloxacin  (1.50) (1.90)  (1.02)  (1.06) 
1.83 1.71  2.00  1.58 
Foreign Norfloxacin  (0.70) (0.75)  (0.88)  (0.83) 
3.04 2.96  2.96  3.00 
Foreign Ofloxacin  (0.86) (0.86)  (0.91)  (0.88) 
106.21 97.63  103.42  105.50 
Domestic Ciprofloxacin  (5.99) (4.34)  (7.22)  (4.51) 
38.96 34.96  36.17  39.42 
Domestic Norfloxacin  (2.71) (2.68)  (2.51)  (3.79) 
18.46 16.00  17.25  17.25 
Domestic Ofloxacin  (6.80) (6.34)  (5.86)  (6.35) 
29.83 28.29  31.21  29.29 
Domestic Sparfloxacin  (5.57) (6.38)  (6.88)  (6.57) 
Price Per-unit API* (Rs.): 
9.58 10.90 10.85  10.07 
Foreign Ciprofloxacin  (1.28) (0.66)  (0.71)  (0.58) 
5.63 5.09  6.05  4.35 
Foreign Norfloxacin  (0.77) (1.33)  (1.39)  (1.47) 
109.46 109.43 108.86  106.12 
Foreign Ofloxacin  (6.20) (6.64)  (7.00)  (11.40) 
11.43 10.67  11.31  11.52 
Domestic Ciprofloxacin  (0.16) (0.15)  (0.17)  (0.13) 
9.51 9.07  8.88  8.73 
Domestic Norfloxacin  (0.24) (0.35)  (0.37)  (0.20) 
91.63 89.64  85.65  93.41 
Domestic Ofloxacin  (16.15) (15.65)  (14.22)  (14.07) 
79.72 78.49  76.88  80.28 
Domestic Sparfloxacin  (9.76) (10.14) (11.85)  (10.37) 
Annual Sales (Rs. Mill) 
41.79 24.31  45.20  29.47 
Foreign Ciprofloxacin  (15.34) (8.16)  (12.73)  (6.48) 
1.28 1.00  0.58  0.73 
Foreign Norfloxacin  (1.01) (0.82)  (0.44)  (0.57) 
54.46 31.84  35.22  31.11 
Foreign Ofloxacin  (13.99) (9.33)  (9.06)  (7.03) 
962.29 585.91 678.74  703.81 
Domestic Ciprofloxacin  (106.26) (130.26)  (122.26)  (87.40) 
222.55 119.71 149.18  158.29 
Domestic Norfloxacin  (38.84) (19.45)  (26.91)  (16.26) 
125.02 96.21  149.36  112.05 
Domestic Ofloxacin  (44.34) (30.11)  (52.82)  (42.59) 
156.17 121.75  161.30  98.11 
Domestic Sparfloxacin  (31.41) (25.76)  (46.74)  (34.20) 
 
*API: Active pharmaceutical ingredient. 
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.  
 
 
 
 
 Table 4 
Analysis of Product Price Variance 
 
Product 
Group 
Partial SS 
Time  
Partial SS 
Region 
Total SS 
 
Percentage 
Explained by 
Time 
Percentage 
Explained by 
Region 
Foreign 
Ciprofloxacin  0.296 0.306  1.047  28.3%  29.2% 
Foreign 
Norfloxacin  1.036 1.002  4.179  24.8%  24.0% 
Foreign 
Ofloxacin  0.429 0.021  0.571  75.2%  3.6% 
Domestic 
Ciprofloxacin  0.005 0.088  0.104  5.0%  84.1% 
Domestic 
Norfloxacin  0.059 0.098  0.198  29.6%  49.4% 
Domestic 
Ofloxacin  2.858 0.104  3.056  93.5%  3.4% 
Domestic 
Sparfloxacin  1.754 0.032  1.860  94.3%  1.7% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5 
Revenue Shares of the Exiting SKUs 
 
Revenue Share of 
Exiting SKUs 
Revenue Shares 
of All SKUs 
Full Sample  1.0% 3.4% 
Northern Region  0.8% 3.3% 
Eastern Region  1.2% 3.6% 
Western Region  1.0% 3.4% 
Southern Region  1.2% 3.3% 
 
 
 Table 6 (a) 
Demand Patterns within the Quinolones Sub-Segment:  
Unconditional Price and Expenditure Elasticities in the Northern Region 
 
Elasticity with Respect to: 
Prices of 
Foreign Product Groups 
Prices of 
Domestic Product Groups 
 
Product 
Group  Cipro Norflo  Oflo  Cipro  Norflo  Oflo  Sparflo 
Overall 
Quinolones 
Expenditure 
-5.57* -0.13
† -0.15* 4.01* 0.11
† 0.11
† 0.16* 1.37* Foreign 
Ciprofloxacin  (1.79)  (0.07)  (0.07) (1.84) (0.06) (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.29) 
-4.27
† -0.45 -4.27
† 3.50
† -6.02 4.51* 4.65* 2.20* Foreign 
Norfloxacin  (2.42)  (1.12)  (2.42) (2.10) (6.23) (1.84)  (1.83)  (1.05) 
-0.11* -0.10
† -1.38* -0.09 0.09
† 0.23 0.11* 1.16* Foreign 
Ofloxacin  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.31) (0.27) (0.05) (0.28)  (0.04)  (0.17) 
0.18* 0.01*  -0.01 -1.68* 0.08* 0.08* 0.10* 1.17* Domestic 
Ciprofloxacin  (0.08)  (0.00)  (0.01) (0.23) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.03) 
0.04* -0.03  0.04* 0.58* -2.23* 0.42* 0.40* 0.73* Domestic 
Norfloxacin  (0.01)  (0.03)  (0.01) (0.17) (0.11) (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.09) 
0.05* 0.05*  0.11 0.77* 0.74* -3.42* 0.74* 0.89* Domestic 
Ofloxacin  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.13) (0.28) (0.08) (0.25)  (0.08)  (0.21) 
0.07* 0.04*  0.07* 1.15* 0.63* 0.63* -2.88* 0.28* Domestic 
Sparfloxacin  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.02) (0.15) (0.06) (0.06)  (0.17)  (0.12) 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Elasticities evaluated at average revenue shares.  Asterisk (*) denotes 
significance at the 5% significance level, and stagger (
†) denotes significance at the 10% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 6 (b) 
Demand Patterns within the Quinolones Sub-Segment: 
Unconditional Price and Expenditure Elasticities in Other Regions 
 
Demand Patterns in the Eastern Region 
Elasticity with Respect to: 
Foreign Groups’ Prices  Domestic Groups’ Prices 
 
Product 
Group  Cipro Norflo  Oflo  Cipro  Norflo  Oflo  Sparflo 
Quinolones 
Expenditure 
-5.94* -0.14
† -0.16* 4.31* 0.13*  0.11 0.17*  1.40*  Foreign 
Ciprofloxacin  (1.95)  (0.08)  (0.08) (2.01) (0.06) (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.31) 
-3.29
† -0.58 -3.29
† 2.64
† -4.60 3.46*  3.59*  1.92*  Foreign 
Norfloxacin  (1.80)  (0.83)  (1.79) (1.53) (4.51) (1.38)  (1.39)  (0.82) 
-0.12* -0.10
† -1.40* -0.10 0.10* 0.24 0.13*  1.17*  Foreign 
Ofloxacin  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.34) (0.31) (0.05) (0.30)  (0.05)  (0.19) 
0.18* 0.01*  -0.01 -1.72* 0.09* 0.08*  0.11*  1.17*  Domestic 
Ciprofloxacin  (0.08)  (0.00)  (0.02) (0.27) (0.02) (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.03) 
0.04* -0.04  0.04*  0.68* -2.42* 0.49*  0.46*  0.70*  Domestic 
Norfloxacin  (0.02)  (0.04)  (0.02) (0.20) (0.13) (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.10) 
0.04
† 0.04*  0.09 0.61* 0.60*  -2.95* 0.60*  0.92*  Domestic 
Ofloxacin  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.10) (0.28) (0.07) (0.22)  (0.07)  (0.17) 
0.05*  0.03*  0.05* 0.92* 0.48* 0.51* -2.51*  0.43*  Domestic 
Sparfloxacin  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.01) (0.17) (0.05) (0.06)  (0.16)  (0.10) 
 
Demand Patterns in the Western Region 
Elasticity with Respect to: 
Foreign Groups’ Prices  Domestic Groups’ Prices 
 
Product 
Group  Cipro Norflo  Oflo  Cipro  Norflo  Oflo  Sparflo 
Quinolones 
Expenditure 
-4.27* -0.09
† -0.11* 2.86* 0.08*  0.06 0.11*  1.26*  Foreign 
Ciprofloxacin  (1.29)  (0.05)  (0.05) (1.33) (0.04) (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.21) 
-7.14
† -0.08 -7.10
† 5.94
† -9.95 7.42*  7.70*  2.99
† Foreign 
Norfloxacin  (3.69) (1.83)  (3.68)  (3.28) (10.15)  (2.97)  (2.96)  (1.78) 
-0.13* -0.12
† -1.45* -0.09 0.12* 0.26 0.13*  1.19*  Foreign 
Ofloxacin  (0.07)  (0.06)  (0.37) (0.29) (0.05) (0.33)  (0.05)  (0.21) 
0.19* 0.01*  0.00 -1.74*  0.09* 0.08*  0.11*  1.18*  Domestic 
Ciprofloxacin  (0.08)  (0.00)  (0.01) (0.24) (0.02) (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.04) 
0.04* -0.04  0.04*  0.67* -2.43* 0.50*  0.47*  0.69*  Domestic 
Norfloxacin  (0.02)  (0.04)  (0.01) (0.18) (0.14) (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.10) 
0.03  0.03*  0.07 0.48* 0.48* -2.57*  0.48*  0.93*  Domestic 
Ofloxacin  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.08) (0.22) (0.05) (0.15)  (0.04)  (0.14) 
0.06*  0.03*  0.05* 0.83* 0.46* 0.49* -2.41*  0.46*  Domestic 
Sparfloxacin  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.01) (0.14) (0.04) (0.05)  (0.12)  (0.09) 
 
Demand Patterns in the Southern Region 
Elasticity with Respect to: 
Foreign Groups’ Prices  Domestic Groups’ Prices 
 
Product 
Group  Cipro Norflo  Oflo  Cipro  Norflo  Oflo  Sparflo 
Quinolones 
Expenditure 
-5.60* -0.13
† -0.15* 4.02* 0.11*  0.10 0.17*  1.37*  Foreign 
Ciprofloxacin  (1.82)  (0.07)  (0.07) (1.87) (0.06) (0.06)  (0.07)  (0.29) 
-5.33
† -0.31 -5.31
† 4.31
† -7.48 5.59*  5.84*  2.49
† Foreign 
Norfloxacin  (3.01)  (1.34)  (3.00) (2.45) (7.34) (2.19)  (2.19)  (1.28) 
-0.14* -0.12
† -1.48* -0.11 0.12* 0.29 0.16*  1.20*  Foreign 
Ofloxacin  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.39) (0.33) (0.06) (0.35)  (0.06)  (0.22) 
0.17* 0.01*  0.00 -1.69*  0.08* 0.07*  0.11*  1.16*  Domestic 
Ciprofloxacin  (0.08)  (0.00)  (0.01) (0.25) (0.02) (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.03) 
0.04* -0.03  0.03*  0.59* -2.25* 0.43*  0.40*  0.73*  Domestic 
Norfloxacin  (0.01)  (0.03)  (0.01) (0.19) (0.12) (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.09) 
0.04
† 0.04*  0.09 0.62* 0.60*  -2.96* 0.60*  0.91*  Domestic 
Ofloxacin  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.10) (0.26) (0.06) (0.19)  (0.07)  (0.17) 
0.08*  0.05*  0.08* 1.38* 0.73* 0.75* -3.23*  0.16  Domestic 
Sparfloxacin  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.02) (0.18) (0.07) (0.08)  (0.21)  (0.14) 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Elasticities evaluated at average revenue shares.  Asterisk (*) denotes 
significance at 5% level, and stagger (
†) denotes significance at the 10% level.   
 
 
 
Table 7 
Upper and Lower Bounds for Marginal Cost, Markup, and Annual Profit by Product Groups 
 within the Quinolone Sub-segment 
 
Product 
Group 
Lower Bound 
for MC (Rs.) 
Upper Bound for 
Markup (Rs.) 
Upper Bound for 
Profit (Rs. Mill) 
Upper Bound 
for MC (Rs.) 
Lower Bound for 
Markup (Rs.) 
Lower Bound 
for Profit (Rs.)
8.3* 19% 26.9 10.3 0%  0.0 Foreign 
Ciprofloxacin  (1.23) (0.12)  (16.55)      
NA NA NA 5.3 0%  0.0 Foreign 
Norfloxacin           
32.3 70%* 106.1* 108.5 0%  0.0 Foreign 
Ofloxacin  (23.16) (0.21)  (31.85)      
4.7* 59%* 1,701.9* 11.2 0%  0.0 Domestic 
Ciprofloxacin  (1.14) (0.10)  (298.58)      
5.2* 43%* 280.7* 9.0 0%  0.0 Domestic 
Norfloxacin  (0.20) (0.02)  (15.32)      
58.7* 34%* 161.2* 90.1 0%  0.0 Domestic 
Ofloxacin  (2.18) (0.02)  (12.80)      
49.5* 37%* 198.5* 78.8 0%  0.0 Domestic 
Sparfloxacin  (1.57) (0.02)  (11.00)      
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Asterisk (*) denotes significance at the 5% level. Estimated lower bound for 
Foreign Norfloxacin’s marginal cost is negative, since the estimated price elasticity is less than 1 in absolute value.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8 
Counterfactual Estimates of Consumer Welfare Losses from Product Withdrawal Due to the Introduction of 
Pharmaceutical Patents (Rs. Bill Per Year) 
 
Loss of Variety and: 
Counterfactual 
Scenarios: Withdrawal 
of One or More Domestic 
Product Groups 
Pure Loss of Variety 
Cross-segment 
Expenditure Switching 
Within-segment Price-
Adjustment and 
Cross-segment 
Expenditure Switching 
4.98* 4.92* 7.32* 
Only Ciprofloxacin  (0.87) (0.89) (1.46) 
0.08 0.08 0.23* 
Only Ofloxacin  (0.08) (0.08) (0.10) 
7.52* 7.40*  12.53*  Ciprofloxacin, Ofloxacin, 
and Norfloxacin  (1.77) (1.80) (4.15) 
6.14* 6.03*  10.58*  Ciprofloxacin, Ofloxacin, 
and Sparfloxacin  (1.42) (1.45) (3.31) 
11.76
† 11.35
† 17.81  All Four Domestic 
Quinolones Products  (6.43) (6.34)  (12.70) 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Asterisk (*) denotes significance at the 5% significance level, and stagger 
(
†) denotes significance at the 10% level.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9 
Counterfactual Estimates of Drug Price Changes  
After Product Withdrawal due to Introduction of Pharmaceutical Patents 
 
Changes in Prices with Cross-segment Expenditure Switching 
and Within-segment Price Adjustment (% of Original Prices) 
Counterfactual Scenarios: 
Withdrawal of One or 
More Domestic Product 
Groups  Foreign Product Groups  Domestic Product Groups 
 Cipro  Norflo  Oflo  Cipro  Norflo  Oflo  Spar 
189.4%* 314.7%  98.2%*  148.6%* 141.4%* 164.1%* 
Only Ciprofloxacin  (0.18) NA (0.21) 
. 
  (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) 
100.4%* 150.0% 102.9%* 102.4%* 108.3%*  110.7%* 
Only Ofloxacin  (0.01) NA (0.08)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
. 
  (0.01) 
247.6%* 627.8% 154.4%*  296.3%*  Ciprofloxacin, Ofloxacin, 
and Norfloxacin  (0.42) NA (0.39) 
. 
 
. 
 
. 
  (0.70) 
255.2%* 627.8% 158.3%*  250.1%*  Ciprofloxacin, Ofloxacin, 
and Sparfloxacin  (0.40) NA (0.37) 
. 
  (0.64) 
. 
 
. 
 
396.4% 627.8% 318.4%
†
All Four Domestic 
Quinolones Products  (3.34) NA (1.73) 
. 
 
. 
 
. 
 
. 
 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Asterisk (*) denotes significance at the 5% level, and stagger (
†) denotes 
significance at  the 10% level. We fix Foreign Norflo’s price at the numbers shown, because an estimate for the MC 
lower bound is not available for this drug. We tried many different values for Foreign Norflo’s counterfactual prices 
and the results are remarkably robust.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Table 10 
Counterfactual Estimates of Foregone Profits of Domestic Producers from Product Withdrawal due to the 
Introduction of Pharmaceutical Patents (Rs. Bill Per Year) 
 
Loss of Variety and: 
Counterfactual 
Scenarios: Withdrawal 
of One or More Domestic 
Product Groups 
Pure Loss of Variety 
Cross-segment 
Expenditure Switching 
Within-segment Price-
Adjustment and 
Cross-segment 
Expenditure Switching 
0.95* 1.09* 0.40 
Only Ciprofloxacin  (0.16) (0.08) (0.31) 
-0.04* -0.03
† -0.14* 
Only Ofloxacin  (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) 
1.24* 1.40* 0.42  Ciprofloxacin, Ofloxacin, 
and Norfloxacin  (0.17) (0.11) (0.60) 
1.11* 1.26* 0.48  Ciprofloxacin, Ofloxacin, 
and Sparfloxacin  (0.17) (0.11) (0.50) 
2.34* 2.34* 2.34*  All Four Domestic 
Quinolones Products  (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Asterisk (*) denotes significance at the 5% level, and stagger (
†) denotes 
significance at  the 10% level.  
 
 
 
 
Table 11 
Counterfactual Estimates of Total Welfare Losses from Product Withdrawal due to the Introduction of 
Pharmaceutical Patents (Rs. Bill Per Year) 
 
Loss of Variety and: 
Counterfactual 
Scenarios: Withdrawal 
of One or More Domestic 
Product Groups 
Pure Loss of Variety 
Cross-segment 
Expenditure Switching 
Within-segment Price-
Adjustment and 
Cross-segment 
Expenditure Switching 
5.94* 6.01* 7.72* 
Only Ciprofloxacin  (0.94) (0.87) (1.20) 
0.04 0.05 0.09 
Only Ofloxacin  (0.08) (0.09) (0.10) 
8.76* 8.80*  12.95*  Ciprofloxacin, Ofloxacin, 
and Norfloxacin  (1.84) (1.77) (3.61) 
7.25* 7.28*  11.07*  Ciprofloxacin, Ofloxacin, 
and Sparfloxacin  (1.46) (1.42) (2.88) 
14.10* 13.70* 20.16  All Four Domestic 
Quinolones Products  (6.57) (6.48)  (12.85) 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Asterisk (*) denotes significance at the 5% level.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Table 12 
Counterfactual Estimates of Profit Gains of Foreign Producers from Product Withdrawal due to the 
Introduction of Pharmaceutical Patents (Rs. Bill Per Year) 
 
 
Loss of Variety and: 
Counterfactual 
Scenarios: Withdrawal 
of One or More Domestic 
Product Groups 
Pure Loss of Variety 
Cross-segment 
Expenditure Switching 
Within-segment Price-
Adjustment and 
Cross-segment 
Expenditure Switching 
0.17* 0.14* 0.35* 
Only Ciprofloxacin  (0.03) (0.06) (0.17) 
0.02 0.02 0.01 
Only Ofloxacin  (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
0.36* 0.28* 0.71
† Ciprofloxacin, Ofloxacin, 
and Norfloxacin  (0.05) (0.11) (0.40) 
0.37* 0.30* 0.79*  Ciprofloxacin, Ofloxacin, 
and Sparfloxacin  (0.05) (0.10) (0.38) 
1.17* 0.88* 2.43
† All Four Domestic 
Quinolones Products  (0.31) (0.41) (1.44) 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Asterisk (*) denotes significance at the 5% significance level, and stagger 
(
†) denotes significance at the 10% level.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 
 
   Additional Tables and Robustness Checks 
                  
                         
 Table A1 
Spectrum of Activity of Various Families of Anti-bacterial Drugs 
 
Organism 
Tetra- 
cyclines 
Chloram- 
penicols 
Ampicillin, 
Amoxycillin 
Cephalo- 
Sporins 
Trimethoprim 
Combinations 
Macro- 
lides 
Other 
Penicillins 
Amino-
glycosides 
Fluoro-
quinolones 
Gram-positive Cocci 
Staphylococcus Aureus 
Non-penicillinase Producing                X x x x x
Penicillinase Producing                X x x x x
Streptococcus Bovis 
Serious Infections                 X x x
Uncomplicated Urinary Tract Infection                  X x x
 
Streptococcus Pneumoniae   x               X x x x x
Gram-negative Cocci 
Neisseria Meningitidis   x             X x
Neisseria Gonorrhaoeae 
Non-beta-lactamase Producing                  X X x x x
 
Beta-lactamase Producing                 X X x x
Gram-negative Bacilli 
Acinetobacter Spp.                 X X x x
Brucella Spp.  x                x x x
Campylobacter Jejuni  x                 x x x
Enterobacter Spp.               X x x x
Escherichia Coli 
Uncomplicated Urinary Tract Infection  x                X X x x
Systemic Infection                X X x x
Francisella Tularensis  x               x x x
Haemophilus Influenzae 
Meningitis                   x X X x x
Other Infections                 X X x x
Klebisiella Pneumonia  x                x X x x x
Legionella Spp.  x              x x x
Proteus Mirabillis                   X X x x
Other Proteus Spp.                   X X x x x
Providencia Spp.                   X X x x x
Pseudomonas Aeruginosa               X x x x
Salmonella Spp.                 X X x x
Serratia Marcescens               X X x x x
Shigella Spp.                  X x x
 
Yersinia Pestis  x               x x x
Anaerobic Bacteria 
Anaerobic Streptococci  x                x X x x
Bacteroides Spp. 
Oropharyngeal Strains  x                 x X X X x
Gastrointestinal Strains                   x X X X x
 
Clostridium spp.  x               x X
 
Notes: An “x” in a cell indicates that at least one member of the family of drugs indicated in the column heading is listed as the anti-microbial drug of choice or as an 
alternative agent for the treatment of the bacterial infection indicated in the row heading.  
Source: Table 15-1, pp.225-226,  Principles and practice of infectious diseases, edited by Gerald L. Mandell, John E. Bennett, Raphael Dolin, 5th edition, 2000. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Table A2 
Coefficient Estimates from the Lower-Level AIDS System 
 
Cross-Price Coefficients 
 
Product  
Group 
 
Constant 
 
Own 
Price 
Coeffi-
cients 
Same 
Molecule, 
Different 
Status 
Different 
Molecule, 
Foreign Group 
Different 
Molecule, 
Domestic 
Group 
 
Coefficient on 
Quinolones 
Expenditure 
 
Eastern 
Region 
Dummy 
 
Western 
Region 
Dummy 
 
Southern 
Region 
Dummy 
0.013 -0.120*            0.115* -0.003
† 0.004* 0.010 0.027*  0.031* 0.007* Foreign 
Ciprofloxacin  (0.02)                  (0.05) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
-0.006               0.000 -0.005 -0.003
† 0.004* 0.001 0.001* 0.000 0.000 Foreign 
Norfloxacin  (0.01)                  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
0.047*                -0.013 0.008 -0.003
† 0.004* 0.005 0.001 -0.003 -0.007* Foreign 
Ofloxacin  (0.02)                  (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
0.603*                  -0.298* 0.115* 0.004* 0.058* 0.102* -0.001 -0.044* 0.033* Domestic 
Ciprofloxacin  (0.04)                  (0.05) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
-0.206*                  -0.177* -0.005 0.004* 0.058* -0.038* -0.041* -0.034* -0.031* Domestic 
Norfloxacin  (0.03)                  (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
0.339*                  -0.191* 0.008 0.004* 0.058* -0.008 0.018 0.034* 0.026* Domestic 
Ofloxacin  (0.04)            (0.01)      (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
0.209*                -0.186*   0.004* 0.058* -0.072* -0.006 0.016* -0.028* Domestic 
Sparfloxacin  (0.03)                  (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Asterisk (*) denotes significance at the 5% level, and stagger (
†) denotes significance at the 10% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
        Table A3 
 Coefficient Estimates from the Upper-Level AIDS System 
 
Cross-Price Coefficients 
 
Product 
Group 
 
Cons-
tant 
 
Tetra-
cycline 
 
Chloram-
phenicol 
 
Ampi
-cillin 
 
Cephalo
-sporin 
 
Trime-
thoprim 
 
Macro-
lides 
 
Other 
penicillin 
 
Quino-
lones 
 
Antibiotics
Expenditure
 
Eastern 
Region 
Dummy 
 
Western 
Region 
Dummy 
 
Southern 
Region 
Dummy 
-0.11        -0.05  -0.03  -0.14
† 0.13* 0.07
† 0.08
† -0.02 -0.05 -0.03*  -0.03* 0.00  0.00 
Tetracyline  (0.09)                          (0.06) (0.02) (0.08) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04)
-0.02                        -0.03 0.04* -0.15* 0.09* 0.00 -0.09* 0.00 0.14* 0.02* 0.02* 0.01 0.01
Chloramphenicol  (0.05)                          (0.02) (0.01) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
0.27                        -0.14
† -0.15* 0.00 0.10 0.02 0.04 0.09 0.03 -0.01 0.07* 0.13* 0.18*
Ampicillin  (0.17)                          (0.08) (0.04) (0.14) (0.10) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.01) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05)
-0.22                    0.13* 0.09* 0.10 0.26
† -0.15
† -0.08 -0.16
† -0.19* -0.03* -0.09* -0.03 -0.06
Cephalosporin  (0.22)                          (0.06) (0.03) (0.10) (0.15) (0.08) (0.10) (0.09) (0.08) (0.01) (0.02) (0.05) (0.05)
0.36*                    0.07
† 0.00 0.02 -0.15
† -0.04 -0.16* 0.03 0.22* 0.01* 0.01 -0.06* -0.05
†
Trimethoprim  (0.13)                          (0.04) (0.02) (0.06) (0.08) (0.13) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03)
0.14                      0.08
† -0.09* 0.04 -0.08 -0.16* 0.19
† 0.08 -0.05 0.00 -0.02 -0.04 -0.03
Macrolides  (0.21)                          (0.04) (0.02) (0.08) (0.10) (0.06) (0.11) (0.08) (0.05) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
0.17                    -0.02 0.00 0.09 -0.16
† 0.03 0.08 0.06 -0.08
† -0.01 0.02
† 0.00 0.00
Other penicillin  (0.18)                          (0.03) (0.02) (0.07) (0.09) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.05) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03)
0.41*                        -0.05 0.14* 0.03 -0.19* 0.22* -0.05 -0.08
† -0.02 0.04* 0.03 -0.01 -0.03
Quinolones  (0.11)                          (0.05) (0.04) (0.07) (0.08) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Asterisk (*) denotes significance at the 5% confidence level, and stagger (
†) denotes significance at the 10% confidence level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table A4 
Other Specifications for the Northern Region 
 
A4(a): Demand Patterns with Seasonal Dummies: Summer 
Elasticity with Respect to: 
Foreign Groups’ Prices  Domestic Groups’ Prices  Product 
Group  Cipro Norflo  Oflo  Cipro Norflo  Oflo Sparflo 
-6.06* -0.14
† -0.15* 4.54*  0.12 0.13
† 0.16*  Foreign 
Ciprofloxacin  (1.91) (0.07) (0.08) (2.15) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
-6.10 0.12  -6.09 5.27 -7.47  6.10  6.19  Foreign 
Norfloxacin  (4.55) (2.26) (4.55) (6.01)  (11.68) (4.62) (4.58) 
-0.11
† -0.11
† -1.58* 0.08  0.11* 0.47  0.11*  Foreign 
Ofloxacin  (0.06) (0.06) (0.32) (0.32) (0.05) (0.29) (0.06) 
0.18* 0.01
† 0.00  -1.72* 0.07* 0.07* 0.10*  Domestic 
Ciprofloxacin  (0.08) (0.00) (0.01) (0.29) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) 
0.03* -0.03 0.03* 0.58* -2.04*  0.36*  0.33*  Domestic 
Norfloxacin  (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.19) (0.11) (0.04) (0.04) 
0.06
† 0.05* 0.23
† 0.89* 0.79*  -3.67* 0.77*  Domestic 
Ofloxacin  (0.03) (0.02) (0.14) (0.40) (0.11) (0.36) (0.12) 
0.07* 0.04* 0.06* 1.25* 0.60* 0.58*  -2.81*  Domestic 
Sparfloxacin  (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.20) (0.06) (0.07) (0.17) 
 
A4(b): Demand Patterns with Seasonal Dummies: Monsoon 
Elasticity with Respect to: 
Foreign Groups’ Prices  Domestic Groups’ Prices  Product 
Group  Cipro Norflo  Oflo  Cipro Norflo  Oflo Sparflo 
-5.80* -0.13
† -0.15* 4.32* 0.11
† 0.11 0.15*  Foreign 
Ciprofloxacin  (1.89) (0.07) (0.07) (2.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
-3.52 -0.35 -3.52  3.03 -4.31 3.51* 3.57*  Foreign 
Norfloxacin  (2.19) (1.04) (2.19) (2.17) (4.92) (1.71) (1.72) 
-0.10
† -0.09
† -1.51* 0.06  0.09*  0.41
† 0.10*  Foreign 
Ofloxacin  (0.05) (0.05) (0.26) (0.29) (0.04) (0.25) (0.04) 
0.19* 0.01*  0.00  -1.72* 0.07* 0.07* 0.10*  Domestic 
Ciprofloxacin  (0.08) (0.00) (0.01) (0.29) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
0.04* -0.03 0.03* 0.61* -2.10*  0.38*  0.35*  Domestic 
Norfloxacin  (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.19) (0.11) (0.04) (0.04) 
0.05
† 0.04* 0.19
† 0.72* 0.65*  -3.20* 0.64*  Domestic 
Ofloxacin  (0.02) (0.02) (0.11) (0.32) (0.08) (0.27) (0.09) 
0.07* 0.04* 0.07* 1.25* 0.60* 0.61*  -2.82*  Domestic 
Sparfloxacin  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.21) (0.07) (0.07) (0.19) 
 
A4(c): Demand Patterns with Seasonal Dummies: Winter 
Elasticity with Respect to: 
Foreign Groups’ Prices  Domestic Groups’ Prices  Product 
Group  Cipro Norflo  Oflo  Cipro Norflo  Oflo Sparflo 
-5.66* -0.13
† -0.14
† 4.19* 0.12
† 0.11 0.14*  Foreign 
Ciprofloxacin  (1.80) (0.07) (0.07) (2.02) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) 
-4.37
† -0.20 -4.36
† 3.78 -5.33 4.34* 4.41*  Foreign 
Norfloxacin  (2.54) (1.42) (2.53) (2.66) (6.10) (2.13) (2.13) 
-0.10
† -0.10
† -1.55* 0.07  0.10*  0.44
† 0.10*  Foreign 
Ofloxacin  (0.06) (0.05) (0.28) (0.30) (0.05) (0.26) (0.05) 
0.19* 0.01*  0.00  -1.73* 0.07* 0.07* 0.10*  Domestic 
Ciprofloxacin  (0.08) (0.00) (0.01) (0.29) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
0.04* -0.03 0.04* 0.68* -2.22*  0.43*  0.39*  Domestic 
Norfloxacin  (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.20) (0.13) (0.05) (0.04) 
0.04
† 0.04* 0.18  0.68*  0.61* -3.08*  0.61*  Domestic 
Ofloxacin  (0.03) (0.02) (0.12) (0.33) (0.10) (0.35) (0.10) 
0.06* 0.03* 0.06* 1.06* 0.51* 0.53*  -2.56*  Domestic 
Sparfloxacin  (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.20) (0.06) (0.07) (0.18) 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Elasticities evaluated at average revenue shares.  Asterisk (*) denotes 
significance at the 5% confidence level, and stagger (
†) denotes significance at the 10% confidence level. 
 
  
Table A5 
 
Demand Patterns with OLS Coefficients 
Elasticity with Respect to: 
Foreign Groups’ Prices  Domestic Groups’ Prices  Product 
Group  Cipro Norflo  Oflo  Cipro Norflo  Oflo Sparflo 
-2.76* -0.05 -0.06  1.39 0.00  -0.01 0.05  Foreign 
Ciprofloxacin  (0.82) (0.05) (0.05) (0.92) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
-1.66 1.24  -1.64 0.59 -2.25  1.02  1.10  Foreign 
Norfloxacin  (1.75) (1.61) (1.75) (2.04) (6.73) (2.04) (2.07) 
-0.04 -0.04  -0.99* -0.07 0.02  -0.02 0.03  Foreign 
Ofloxacin  (0.05) (0.04) (0.26) (0.24) (0.05) (0.23) (0.05) 
0.06 0.00  -0.01  -1.56* 0.07* 0.07* 0.10*  Domestic 
Ciprofloxacin  (0.04) (0.00) (0.01) (0.25) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) 
0.01 -0.01  0.01 0.46* -2.18*  0.40*  0.39*  Domestic 
Norfloxacin  (0.02) (0.04) (0.01) (0.20) (0.11) (0.04) (0.04) 
0.02 0.01 0.00  0.81*  0.73* -3.16*  0.71*  Domestic 
Ofloxacin  (0.03) (0.02) (0.10) (0.22) (0.07) (0.24) (0.07) 
0.06* 0.01  0.04
† 1.25* 0.63* 0.64*  -2.76*  Domestic 
Sparfloxacin  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.15) (0.06) (0.06) (0.17) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A6 
Counterfactual Estimates of Consumer Welfare Losses from Product Withdrawal Due to the Introduction 
of Pharmaceutical Patents, Assuming MC = P (Rs. Bill Per Year) 
 
Loss of Variety and: 
Counterfactual Scenarios: 
Withdrawal of One or More 
Domestic Product Groups 
Pure Loss of Variety 
Cross-segment 
Expenditure Switching 
Within-segment Price-
Adjustment and 
Cross-segment 
Expenditure Switching 
4.98* 4.92*  9.47* 
Only Ciprofloxacin  (0.92) (0.94)  (2.32) 
0.08 0.08  4.08* 
Only Ofloxacin  (0.09) (0.09)  (0.83) 
7.52* 7.40*  14.67*  Ciprofloxacin, Ofloxacin, 
and Norfloxacin  (1.83) (1.88)  (5.52) 
6.14* 6.03*  12.83*  Ciprofloxacin, Ofloxacin, 
and Sparfloxacin  (1.41) (1.46)  (4.57) 
11.76
† 11.35
† 19.46  All Four Domestic 
Quinolones Products  (6.28) (6.28)  (15.20) 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Asterisk (*) denotes significance at 5% confidence level, and stagger (
†) 
denotes significance at 10% confidence level.  
 
 
 
 